

# CURRENT HISTORY

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# CURRENT HISTORY

FOUNDED IN 1914

NOVEMBER 1993

VOL. 92, NO. 577

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## EDITOR'S NOTE:

"If the killing starts nobody will be able to stop it" is how an adviser to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman accurately summed up the what would happen with the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia. The destruction of Vukovar, the shelling of noncombatants in Sarajevo, the chilling concept of "ethnic cleansing," rape as a weapon of war, killing fueled by too long a memory of wrongs unpunished in the past—all are evidence that Yugoslavia's disintegration has given rebirth in Europe to what was thought to have been laid to rest with the end of World War II.

It is a confusing situation: new countries with intertwined histories and conflicting interpretations of the past—and the present. This issue of *Current History* is devoted to providing an understanding of the main combatants in the conflict and a discussion of how the neighboring Balkan countries have fared since the revolutions of 1989. We also review the inept Western response to the fighting, and what it means for the future as the euphoria of Communist collapse gives way to the reality of building democracy.

Coming in December:

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"[Nineteen ninety-three] is not 1914, and the current crises in the Balkans are not about to lead to World War III. Hence the periodic statements by American officials claiming that 'no vital national interest' of the United States is at stake. Nevertheless, European and American leaders confess to being bothered and stymied by this 'problem from hell,' to which their diplomats have thus far been able to devise only 'solutions born in hell.' "

## The West and "The Problem from Hell"

BY JOHN FENSKE

Some damned silly thing in the Balkans," is how Otto von Bismarck foresaw the origins of the next great war in Europe. His prediction came true on June 28, 1914, when a Serbian nationalist assassinated the heir to the Austrian throne in the Balkan city of Sarajevo, thus igniting the general conflagration now known as World War I. The major European powers of the day were initially confident that the ensuing regional crisis would be resolved quickly, most likely in a brief war that would simply readjust the familiar continental balance of power. But they were wrong.

In 1993, Serbian nationalism, Sarajevo, and war in the Balkans are once again in the news. And again, the major chancelleries of Europe believe that the military consequences of this crisis can be readily contained within the region. If they are mistaken, however, it will not be because the lessons of 1914 have been forgotten. The success of NATO during the cold war demonstrates how acutely aware Western Europeans and Americans have been of the need for an exacting management of balance-of-power issues.

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JOHN FENSKE is an assistant professor of political science at Williams College and has written on French politics, Franco-German relations, and European security issues.

<sup>1</sup>The "problem from hell" is how Warren Christopher, the United States secretary of state, once characterized the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lord David Owen, the European Community's special envoy on Yugoslavia, has recently spoken of his efforts producing only "solutions born in hell."

The NATO allies believe that war today in the former Yugoslavia will not degenerate into a "world war" precisely because they are confident that the current situation does not resemble 1914 in crucial respects. Then, the Great Power alliance systems behind the Balkan antagonists, coupled with an immoderate style of diplomacy, made for an unstable configuration ready to spiral out of control and draw in all the major powers. By contrast, the main military powers in Europe today are circumspect in the extreme, keeping a prudent distance from traditional or potential Balkan allies. Moreover, with the end of the cold war, there is no longer an overarching rivalry between alliance systems that can be drawn by client states into a much wider war.

So 1993 is not 1914, and the current crises in the Balkans are not about to lead to World War III. Hence the periodic statements by American officials claiming that "no vital national interest" of the United States is at stake. Nevertheless, European and American leaders confess to being bothered and stymied by this "problem from hell," to which their diplomats have thus far been able to devise only "solutions born in hell."<sup>1</sup> Why the grave concern in Western capitals? The quandary of Europe and the United States can be summed up in two words: politics and principles.

### THE VIEW FROM HOME

The politics of developing policy on the current Balkan situation are treacherous, in both domestic and alliance contexts. The Western media have covered the fighting in the former Yugoslavia as vividly and thoroughly as any issue. In consequence, public opinion in

the European Community (EC) and in North America has been literally horrified at the extent to which civilians have been targets of military operations and victims of sheer barbarism. "Something must be done!" is the predominant sentiment. After all, it is believed, the diplomatic and military prowess of the Western allies is unmatched in the post-cold war era. Their coalition was easily victorious in the 1991 Persian Gulf War to liberate Kuwait, and the 1992 intervention in Somalia has achieved at least its primary goal of averting mass starvation. So the question naturally arises: why do our governments not apply whatever means necessary to end the senseless suffering and separate the combatants? Yugoslavia is closer to Western Europe than either Kuwait or Somalia. Located between Italy and Greece, one might say that the problem of the former Yugoslavia is right in the middle of the EC.

European and American politicians on the whole demonstrate an exquisite sensitivity to the stronger currents of public opinion. Recent events in the Balkans have been no exception to this rule, and already the EC countries and the United States have done much to try to help end the fighting and alleviate suffering.

In mid-1991, the EC sent delegations to the area and began discussing what leverage it might exert in favor of peace. Peter Carrington of Britain was appointed as the Community's first special envoy and chaired a peace conference in fall 1991. His efforts, however, failed to halt the fighting in Slovenia and Croatia, the initial phase of the Yugoslav breakup. After Lord Carrington resigned, his post was taken by David Owen, also of Britain. The EC countries agreed in December 1991 on a joint diplomatic approach to recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. A special EC panel was commissioned to investigate whether the two republics met the EC's criteria for recognition. Also, in 1992 the EC asked former Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki to investigate charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Yugoslav war zones.

<sup>2</sup>For a detailed account and critique, see Rosalyn Higgins, "The New United Nations and the Former Yugoslavia," *International Affairs*, vol.69, no.3 (July 1993).

<sup>3</sup>In UN terminology, "peacekeeping" means placing neutral military forces between warring factions that have agreed to their presence. The UN's rules of engagement restrict peacekeepers to self-defense and prohibit even the defense of civilians, let alone action on behalf of an armed party to the conflict. With few exceptions (such as the war to liberate Kuwait), the UN stays out of "peacemaking," an altogether more active role.

<sup>4</sup>The WEU is a European defense organization consisting of nine EC countries. Its more ambitious members would like it to one day take on the role of an "independent European defense identity," whereas the more cautious ones want it to be a "European pillar within NATO."

As the EC began to realize the inadequacy of its own efforts to stop the bloodshed, it called on the UN Security Council.<sup>2</sup> The UN appointed its own special envoys to the region, first the American Cyrus Vance and then his successor, the Norwegian Thorvald Stoltenberg, who have closely coordinated their efforts with those of the EC. There has also been increasing involvement of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which together provide "peacekeeping" and humanitarian assistance.<sup>3</sup>

French, British, and Canadian soldiers form the bulk of UNPROFOR troops, with large contingents also coming from many other countries. NATO has helped the UN with aerial surveillance from its AWACS, and later, with the fighter aircraft necessary for enforcement of a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) have organized naval patrols in the Adriatic Sea to enforce UN embargoes.<sup>4</sup> The governments and private relief organizations of many Western countries have responded to the needs of people in the Yugoslav war zones for food, medicine, and assistance. EC members and other European countries have taken in thousands of refugees from the war. There is, therefore, much generosity in the Western response to the Balkan crises of the 1990s.

All the same, a significant fraction of Western public opinion wants more done to stop the fighting and provide aid to the victims. By mid-1992 most Western analysts and diplomats had given up hoping that Yugoslavia would stay intact and tacitly agreed to name the government of Serbia, along with its allies the Croatian Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs, as the primary aggressors. Thus, what had generally been portrayed up until then as a "civil war" became a "war of aggression" in Western discourse. As the breakup reached its second phase with the war in Bosnia, sympathy grew among Western publics for the beleaguered Muslim civilians of Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities under Serb (or sometimes Croat) siege. At a minimum, activist sentiment would like to see greater efforts to protect the Muslims and mitigate their sufferings. More ambitious interventionists want to see Western military action to punish the Serbs, perhaps even to push them back out of areas they have captured.

Yet there is a serious objection to taking military measures to stop the fighting. The gist of it is conveyed by a witticism coined somewhere inside the United States Department of Defense: "We do deserts—we don't do mountains." Kuwait and Iraq were ideal terrain for reconnaissance, tactics, and logistics. The wooded hills and mountains of Bosnia, however, resemble more the jungles of Southeast Asia, since they provide cover for the enemy and present numerous physical obstacles to the rapid and successful taking of

territory by American or European forces. Western military planners are confronted with the unappealing prospect of needing large numbers of troops, of keeping them in place for a long time, and of losing the lives of many soldiers. As the United States learned in Vietnam, it is not always easy to know in advance whether the amount of pain necessary to get a determined opponent to submit can be exerted at a cost acceptable back home.

Thus, Western politicians are understandably reluctant to commit themselves to a peacemaking expedition of unknown duration. It is almost certain that there would be more Western body bags returning home from Bosnia than from the war to liberate Kuwait. With such images on the evening television news, one can readily foresee majority opinion in the West swinging firmly toward withdrawal. In addition, the Serbs have the option of widening the war to include Kosovo and Macedonia, thus dramatically raising the cost to allied forces. If there were an outright failure to achieve order in the region, or perhaps just an ambiguous success, the humiliation and the spilled Western blood could revive the "Vietnam syndrome" in Washington and allied capitals.

Even the best efforts of UN and EC envoys were not much appreciated by the politicians and their military planners. The plan drawn up by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen to end the conflict would have instituted a permanent cease-fire, partitioned Bosnia along ethnic lines, and sent in a peacekeeping contingent much larger than the existing UNPROFOR. While there would be less danger than under active peacemaking, these troops would be committed for an indefinite time to the guarding of hotly contested borders in a highly unstable situation. The inherent flaws of the plan soon became the object of another cynical remark: "The only thing worse than the failure of Vance-Owen would be the success of Vance-Owen."

### THE ALLIES' PERSPECTIVE

Difficulties with the politics of intervention are not confined to the domestic arena, since there have been numerous squabbles among nominal allies over how to handle the Yugoslav crises. In the early stages, Germany surprised its EC partners by uncharacteristically insisting they follow its lead in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia as independent states. The result was the EC's decision in December 1991 to recognize the two new states in January 1992 so long as they met certain conditions. Even that compromise was hard to keep, since the Germans went ahead with their own recognition before the end of December. The rift caused by the German initiative has still not been repaired. In the middle of this year, Secretary of State Warren Christopher claimed there was general agreement that the Germans had made a mistake that opened the way for the even more intractable problems in Bosnia.

Thus, less than a year after its unification in October 1990 and the recovery of complete sovereignty, Germany seemed to many outsiders to be trying to assert a newfound diplomatic independence, if not a right of priority concerning its "backyard" in eastern Europe. Serbian propaganda used German policy to revive fears about the pro-Nazi regime in Croatia during World War II. German public opinion held that Slovenians and Croatians had as much right to self-determination as did Germans and that, in any event, independence and international recognition were the surest means to block the violent designs of the Serbian regime in Belgrade.

In a similar manner, each of the major allied players has its own prejudices and preferences complicating the development of a coherent approach. Furthermore, each of the ex-Yugoslavia's neighbors has its views or even vital interests (real or perceived) at stake. Greece, for example, has been a traditional ally of Serbia, a bond that was strengthened by a concern over the newly independent republic of Macedonia. There was nearly unanimous opposition among Greek political forces to the existence of a country on their northern border bearing the name of an ancient Greek province, ostensibly because the newcomer might dispute the border between the two countries. For over a year a Greek veto prevented EC recognition of Macedonia. In mid-1993 a compromise was struck and the country was admitted to the UN, though without a flag and under the temporary name, "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia."

Russia also has traditional ties to Serbia, which have had the effect of paralyzing or delaying forceful action in several instances. Russian President Boris Yeltsin needed to protect himself against claims by nationalist opponents that he was giving in too readily to Western demands that Russia abandon support for Serbian interests. Seeing Yeltsin as their best hope in another troubled region (one ultimately more important, many would add), Western leaders felt obliged to be understanding of his domestic difficulties.

### THE BURDEN OF PRINCIPLES AND PRECEDENTS

Citizens and allies thus present two kinds of political difficulty to Western leadership, supplying pushes and pulls in many directions. After viewing televised images of brutality and suffering, commentators and public opinion may well demand further involvement, yet essentially the same kind of sentiment would be activated by casualties involving "our boys"—only then it would point toward withdrawal.

The way out of the maze of political expediency is through careful reexamination of the fundamental principles Western society has at stake in the Balkans today. A preliminary list would certainly include: the existence of a liberal democracy, respect for borders, national self-determination, nonaggression, and protec-

tion of basic human rights. Unfortunately, all are being violated in Europe today, in places no more distant than an hour or two from peaceful and prosperous zones. And upon closer examination, some principles are in contradiction with others.

Take, for example, "respect for borders" and "national self-determination." The first suggests that Yugoslavia should have stayed whole, while the second implies that Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia all had a perfect right to secede after consulting their people. Furthermore, within the borders of Croatia and Bosnia live significant numbers of Serbs, who presumably have just as much right to self-determination as the majority.

The humanitarian efforts of the EC, the UNHCR, and the UNPROFOR are all intended to address the infringement of "basic human rights" in the war zones. But the very presence of these personnel has provided a rationale for denying the means of "self-determination" and "respect for borders" to the internationally recognized Bosnian government. The most aggressive plan for Western military action officially proposed thus far—the "lift and strike"<sup>5</sup> option favored by the American government—languished due to opposition from the British and the French, who were concerned about the dangers it posed to their UNPROFOR troops. In another example of allied disharmony, the Europeans were quick to remark on the supposed hypocrisy of American officials, who felt no obligation to furnish troops for UNPROFOR contingents in the war zones (though there are some American UNPROFOR observers in Macedonia), yet who were not entirely disappointed that the presence of French and British troops gave them a decent excuse for abandoning the strategy of "lift and strike."

What is arguably the most important principle of all, however, has been obscured by the recriminations among allies and the search for immediate palliatives: the principle of "setting positive precedents" on behalf of other fundamental principles. The outcome of the war to liberate Kuwait made very clear the willingness of the UN, the United States, and many other countries to confront unprovoked aggression across internationally recognized boundaries, even at great cost to themselves. Now that precedent has been squandered by the inability of the EC, the UN, and the United States to agree at an early stage of this conflict on how best to proceed. There are, after all, would-be ethnic cleansers

elsewhere in the world who are watching the West's response with keen interest, and who are awaiting the outcome of the proposed UN war-crimes tribunal.

The list of negative precedents in the present instance is maddeningly long: the indecision of the EC and its inability to master the crisis at the outset, the near total irrelevance of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in finding a solution, the use of force to change borders in lands recently freed of Communist control, the flouting of UN resolutions and the most elementary human rights, the apparent indifference of belligerents to the threat of NATO military action, the public disagreements among Western allies, and the cynical use of humanitarian relief efforts as a shield behind which to continue attacks on civilians. By comparison, the potentially helpful precedents are few and of dubious value to some: the willingness of the United States to consult with allies and the UN before proceeding, a desire to give negotiated settlements sufficient time to work before resorting to military force, and the exercise of new institutional linkages (such as between the UN and NATO) that may be of use in managing future crises.

Western Europe these days has a bad conscience with regard to the Balkans. Its inability to devise a coherent and effective approach has much to do with its own troubled past in mastering the demons of nationalism and ethnicity. Additionally, there is a disturbing resonance between contemporary ethnic-national troubles inside many EC states (such as the political uproar over North African immigrants in France and over Turkish immigrants in Germany) and the Muslim-Christian divisions in the former Yugoslavia. Many Muslims throughout the world have noted the alacrity with which Europeans and Americans made war on Iraq and compare it unfavorably with the apparent timidity with which the West defends the rights of Muslims in Bosnia. America has a slightly better conscience, mainly because it believes that the European allies should be able to manage the situation. For the West, in general, there is inevitably shame at being aware of how one can live in peace and enjoy the fruits of liberal democracy while, not far away, others are being denied these benefits by armed hoodlums who could and should be taught a lesson.

"Politics is the art of the possible" is how Bismarck summed up the contest between principle and expediency. In the present Balkan crises, a prudent analysis of Western interests and possible outcomes suggests that more forceful intervention would not be wise. Yet the burden of principle and precedent indicates just the opposite, and the conscience of the West longs for leaders with a more ambitious conception of the possible. ■

<sup>5</sup>"Lift" refers to a selective lifting of the embargo on weapons to the war zones, so that the Bosnian Muslims could receive better means to defend themselves. The "strike" part means that NATO or American warplanes would attack Bosnian Serb positions to assist the Muslim counteroffensive.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia has led to a reevaluation of the idea that a multi-ethnic state is a viable entity. The factors that led to the dismantling of such a state in Yugoslavia are many and are open to revision, but one of the lessons that can be drawn from the process is clear: "The wars in the former Yugoslavia [show] that the principles and practices that provided a stable framework for international security in the era of the cold war are no longer sufficient to preserve the peace."

## Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart

BY STEVEN L. BURG

The disintegration of the Yugoslav federation and its descent into atavistic interethnic violence cannot be attributed to any single factor. Internal political conflicts in the 1980s, and the effort by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to mobilize Serb nationalism on behalf of a strengthened federation, destroyed the cohesion of the country's regional Communist leaderships and weakened their control over society. Deteriorating economic conditions—especially plummeting living standards—eroded the benefits of sustaining the Yugoslav state and stimulated the rise of mass nationalisms and interethnic hostilities. The conflicting nationalist aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples and their leaders' efforts to maximize power, led to conflict over the control of disputed territories.

The end of the cold war left both Soviet and Western policymakers believing that Yugoslavia no longer held the strategic significance, or merited the attention, it had enjoyed in a world divided between East and West. This mistaken belief, as well as the attention commanded by the Persian Gulf War, led to neglect of the brewing crisis in Yugoslavia until the cost of meaningful action had risen beyond the point acceptable to Western policymakers and their publics. Even when less costly but still effective action remained possible, Western policymakers were deterred from acting by the fear that the dissolution of Yugoslavia, even if achieved through peaceful negotiation, would hasten the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The fall of Yugoslavia thus can be attributed to internal conflict and the international community's failure to respond to the crisis effectively. However, forceful action by either Yugoslav leaders or American and European administrations would have required

innovative thinking about some of the most basic principles of the international system and the post-cold war security framework in the Euro-Atlantic community. No political leadership—Yugoslav, American, or European—was then ready to confront these tasks. The only positive outcome of the Yugoslav debacle, therefore, may be the stimulus it has provided for such new thinking.

### THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF DISINTEGRATION

By the mid-1970s, Yugoslavia had become a highly decentralized federation in which the constituent republics dominated the central government. Regional leaderships carefully protected the interests of their territorial constituencies at the expense of other regions and the federation. The regional leaders shared a common interest in preserving the Communist political order that shielded them from responsibility and popular accountability but little else. Ethnic and political integration processes had only modest impact. The proportion of the population that declared itself to be "Yugoslav" rather than an ethnic identity in the national census, for example, increased from 1.3 percent in 1971 to 5.4 percent in 1981. For the vast majority of the population, distinct ethnic or national identities continued to command emotional loyalties and provide the most powerful bases for political mobilization.

The ethnically defined territorial structures of the Yugoslav system reinforced the political strength of ethnic identities and intensified political divisions in the leadership. Federal political bodies, including the collective state presidency and the Communist party leadership, were composed of representatives of the republics and provinces, selected by the regional leaderships. Individual positions in these bodies, including the country's prime ministership and presidency, rotated among the regions according to an explicit agreement. Only the army remained a unified, all-Yugoslav, organization.

STEVEN L. BURG is associate professor of politics at Brandeis University. This article is part of a larger project, Nationalism and Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: Challenges to American Foreign Policy, supported by The Twentieth Century Fund.


While the political regions of Yugoslavia were defined in ethnic terms, in most cases they were not ethnically homogeneous. With the exception of Slovenia, their leaderships could not mobilize ethnic nationalism in support of political ambition or fulfill the nationalist aspirations of their ethnic majorities without alienating substantial minority populations and raising the prospect of severe ethnic conflict. The vast majority of ethnic Slovenes were concentrated in Slovenia and made up the majority of the population. Efforts by ethnically Slovene regional leaders to advance Slovene national-cultural interests and to strengthen Slovenian autonomy effectively encompassed all Slovenes. At the same time, these efforts neither threatened the status of a large minority inside Slovenia nor challenged the power of any other group over its own republic by encouraging a large Slovene minority population outside the republic to demand autonomy.

In Croatia, however, Serbs constituted a large minority or even a majority of the population in several areas of the republic. Croatian leaders thus could not pursue exclusionary nationalist ambitions inside the Croatian state without risking the alienation of a large and territorially compact Serb minority that enjoyed strong links to Serbs outside the republic's borders. At the same time, a nationalistic Croatian government would stimulate unrest among the large, territorially compact population of ethnic Croats in adjacent areas of neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina.

No single group could claim the overall majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Muslims constituted the largest group (about 44 percent of the population in the 1991 census), they did not represent a majority. Serbs (over 31 percent) and Croats (more than 17 percent) constituted large minorities in the republic's

population. In many areas of Bosnia there was no single ethnic majority. In the larger cities, those who took the nonethnic "Yugoslav" identity constituted from 20 to 25 percent of the population. Thus the pattern of ethnic settlement in Bosnia was highly complex. No ethnic leadership could advance exclusionary nationalist ambitions on behalf of its ethnic constituency without alienating vast portions of the population—including substantial numbers of its own group who had adopted the multiethnic civic culture associated with "Yugoslavism."

By the mid-1980s, the collective leaderships of the country were divided between those who supported a looser association among the regions and those who continued to support a strengthened federal government. This division was reinforced by differences over the scope and pace of further economic and political reform. The Yugoslav economy had gone into sharp decline in the 1980s. Living standards fell and regional economic differences widened. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, per capita national income in Slovenia had been about six times that in Kosovo



province and about three times that in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Income in Croatia had been about four times that in Kosovo and about twice that in Macedonia and Bosnia. By 1988, income in Slovenia was more than eight times that in Kosovo and income in Croatia was approximately five times higher. The frictions introduced by these growing inequalities were intensified by the ethnic differences between the regions, and especially by the increasingly violent conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

### KOSOVO AND MILOSEVIC

The 1980s began with the outbreak of nationalist demonstrations by the Albanian people in Kosovo.

# THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA

## 1990

Jan. 22—The Communist party votes to allow other parties to compete in a new system of “political pluralism.”

Feb. 5—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the republic of Serbia, says he will send troops to take control of Kosovo, a province where ethnic violence has entered its 2d week.

April 8—The republic of Slovenia holds parliamentary elections—the 1st free elections since World War II.

April 22—The 1st free elections in more than 50 years are held in the republic of Croatia.

July 5—The parliament of the Serbian republic suspends the autonomous government of the Kosovo region. On July 2, ethnic Albanian members of the Kosovo legislature declared the region a separate territory within the Yugoslav federation.

July 6—The state president orders Slovenia’s parliament to rescind its July 2 declaration that the republic’s laws take precedence over those of the Yugoslav federation.

Sept. 3—In Kosovo, more than 100,000 ethnic Albanians strike, closing factories, offices, stores, and schools to protest Serbian takeovers of formerly Albanian-controlled enterprises and the dismissal of Albanian workers.

Sept. 13—The Yugoslav press agency reports that ethnic Albanian members of the dissolved parliament of Kosovo have adopted an alternative constitution and have voted to extend the mandate of parliament until new elections are held. The Serbian government has called the alternative constitution illegal.

Nov. 11—The republic of Macedonia holds its 1st free elections since 1945.

Nov. 18—Parliamentary elections are held in the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Dec. 9—The 1st free parliamentary elections in Serbia since 1938 are held.

## 1991

Feb. 20—The Slovenian parliament approves laws allowing the republic to take over defense, banking, and other government functions from the central Yugoslav government; the parliament also approves a resolution to divide Yugoslavia into two separate states; Slovenia has warned that it will secede if the other republics do not approve the plan.

Feb. 21—The Croatian parliament adopts measures giving the republic government veto power over central government laws it considers threatening to the republic’s sovereignty; the parliament also adopts resolutions that support the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation.

March 2—After reports of violent clashes between Serb villagers and Croatian security forces, Borisav Jovic, the leader of the collective presidency, orders federal army troops to the Croatian village of Pakrac.

March 16—Milosevic declares that he is refusing to recognize the authority of the collective presidency; with this act he effectively declares Serbia’s secession from Yugoslavia.

March 17—Milosevic proclaims Krajina, an area in Croatia where 200,000 ethnic Serbs live, a “Serbian autonomous region.”

June 25—The parliaments of Slovenia and Croatia pass declarations of independence. The federal parliament in Belgrade—the capital of Serbia as well as of Yugoslavia—asks the army to intervene to prevent the secessions.

June 27—Slovenian Defense Minister Janez Jansa says, “Slovenia is at war” with the federal government.

July 18—The federal presidency announces that it is ordering all federal army units to withdraw from Slovenia.

Sept. 8—Results of yesterday’s referendum in Macedonia show that about 75% of voters favor independence; ethnic Albanians boycotted the referendum.

Oct. 1—Heavy fighting in Croatia between Croatian militia and rebel Serbs (aided by the federal army) continues near the Adriatic port city of Dubrovnik.

## 1992

March 1—A majority of voters approve a referendum on independence in Bosnia; Serb citizens, who comprise 32% of Bosnia’s population but control 60% of the territory, have threatened to secede if the referendum is passed.

March 25—Fighting between Serb militias—backed by the federal army—and Bosnian government troops begins.

April 5—After the Bosnian government refuses to rescind a call-up of the national guard, Serb guerrillas shell Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital.

April 27—Serbia and Montenegro announce the establishment of a new Yugoslavia composed of the 2 republics.

May 19—At a news conference in Washington, D. C., Haris Silajdzic, the foreign minister of Bosnia, says his country is being subjected to “ethnic cleansing” by Serb forces.

May 24—In an election in Kosovo termed illegal by Belgrade, ethnic Albanians vote overwhelmingly to secede from the rump Yugoslav state.

July 2—Croat nationalists living in Bosnia declare an independent state that includes almost one-third of the territory of Bosnia; Mate Boban, head of the 30,000-strong Croatian Defense Council militia, says the name of the new republic is Herzeg-Bosna.

Nov. 3—*The New York Times* reports the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army has quit the siege of Dubrovnik, Croatia, and has withdrawn its forces from the surrounding area.

## 1993

Jan. 22—Croatian army units attack Serb-held positions in Maslenica and the port city of Zadar; Ivan Milas, a Croatian vice president, says the attacks came after Serbs delayed returning the areas to Croatian control as called for in the January 1992 UN-sponsored cease-fire agreement; state radio in Belgrade says the self-declared Serbian Krajina Republic has declared war on Croatia.

April 7—The Security Council approves UN membership for Macedonia under the provisional name “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as a compromise with the Greek government; Greece has objected to the new country using the same name as Greece’s northernmost province.

May 16—In the Bosnian town of Pale, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic announces that in a 2-day referendum, at least 90% of Serb voters rejected the provisional peace plan put forward by UN mediator Cyrus Vance and EC mediator Lord Owen; the plan called for a UN-monitored cease-fire; the establishment of a central government composed of 3 Muslims, 3 Croats, and 3 Serbs; the creation of 10 partially autonomous provinces with proportional representation of ethnic groups in the provincial governments; and the return of forcibly transferred property. Karadzic says the world should now recognize that a new state—Republika Srpska—exists in the Serb-controlled territory in Bosnia.

Aug. 28—The mainly Muslim Bosnian parliament votes 65 to 0 to reject a peace plan devised by the UN and the EC that would divide the country into 3 separate republics based on ethnicity; in the mountain town of Grude, the parliament of the self-declared Croat state approves the plan and officially declares the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosna; the self-declared Bosnian Serb parliament also accepts the plan. ■

Kosovo is viewed by Serbs as the "cradle" of their nation, but is populated by a demographically robust majority (over 80 percent in 1991) of ethnic Albanians. The demonstrations were initially suppressed by military force. But the decade saw almost continuous and often violent confrontations in the province between Serbs and Albanians. The Serbian leadership in Belgrade responded with increasingly repressive measures against the Albanians and their indigenous leaders.

Violence against Serbs in Kosovo contributed to the growth of nationalist sentiment among Serbs in Serbia and the other regions of Yugoslavia. But the movement received its most important support from Serbian Communist party President Slobodan Milosevic. Motivated at least in part by genuine personal outrage over the treatment of Serbs in Kosovo and by the failure of other Serbian leaders to defend them, Milosevic ousted a key proponent of interethnic accommodation with the Albanians of Kosovo and seized control of the Serbian leadership in September 1987. He then escalated his public defense of Serbian ethnic and political interests. He exploited the situation in Kosovo to further stimulate popular nationalism among Serbs all across Yugoslavia, and used that nationalism as leverage against the leaders of other republics and provinces. The intensity of popular emotions among Serbs was demonstrated by a series of large-scale, openly nationalist demonstrations across Vojvodina, Serbia, and Montenegro in the fall of 1988, and by a mass gathering of Serbs in Kosovo in June 1989.

The growing force of Serbian nationalism allowed Milosevic to oust independent leaders in Vojvodina and Montenegro, replacing them with more subservient ones, and to intensify repressive measures against the Albanians of Kosovo while placing that province, heretofore a relatively autonomous territory within the Serbian republic, under direct rule from Belgrade. These changes gave Milosevic effective control over four of the eight regional leaderships represented in the collective state presidency, the most authoritative executive body in the country. However, the disproportionate Serbian influence contributed to the de-legitimation of central authority and accelerated the political dissolution of the country.

Milosevic represented a powerful synthesis of Serbian nationalism, political conservatism, support for centralism, and resistance to meaningful economic reform. Developments in Serbia under his leadership stood in stark contrast to those in Slovenia, where the growth of popular nationalism took the form of demands for political democracy and rapid economic reform, the pluralization of group activity in the republic, and support for further confederalization of the Yugoslav regime. In Serbia the republic remained under the control of the unreformed Communist party. The Serbian Communists renamed themselves the Socialist party and co-opted some formerly dissident

intellectuals into their leadership, but remained under Milosevic's control. The Slovenian Communist leadership, in contrast, cooperated with emergent social and political forces in their republic to move rapidly toward a more pluralistic order. The Slovenian leadership, rather than seeing organized popular pressure only as a threat, also viewed it as an important and necessary asset in its struggle for economic and political reform in Belgrade.

## THE DISINTEGRATION BEGINS

Relations between Serbia and Slovenia began to grow tense at both the elite and mass levels. In October 1988 the Slovenian representative to the central party presidium resigned because of increasingly acrimonious relations with Milosevic. In February 1989 the use of federal militia to suppress a general strike in Kosovo raised widespread concern among Slovenes that, if such force could be used against more than 1 million Albanians, it could also be used against the 2 million Slovenes. This fear was not entirely unfounded. A year earlier an independent Slovenian journal, *Mladina*, revealed that federal Yugoslav military leaders had met to discuss emergency plans for the takeover of the republic.

After the suppression of the strike, the president of the Slovenian Communist party, Milan Kucan, publicly condemned the repression in Kosovo. This marked the beginning of open conflict between the Ljubljana and Belgrade leaderships—the former having embarked on a secessionist strategy calling for internal democratization, and the latter having begun an effort to re-centralize power and authority in the entire country while constructing a new, nationalist authoritarian regime in Serbia.

The escalation of conflict in Yugoslavia reached crisis proportions in the fall of 1989. The Slovenian leadership adopted constitutional amendments in September asserting the economic and political sovereignty of the republic, denying the right of the federation to intervene, and claiming the right to secede. In December it blocked an attempt by Serbian nationalists supported by Milosevic to pressure the Slovenian government into abandoning its strategy by bringing Serbs to Ljubljana for a mass demonstration. Milosevic responded to Slovene resistance by breaking off economic relations between the two republics. Democratic activist groups in Slovenia pressed for a complete break with Serbia. That move came the following month, at the January 1990 extraordinary congress of the ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

Originally conceived by Milosevic and the Serbian leadership as a means of imposing greater central authority, the congress instead became the occasion for the collapse of the old regime. Unwilling and politically unable to support a draft platform calling for greater party unity, the Slovenian delegation walked out of the

congress. The military and other regional party delegations, unwilling to surrender their own independence, refused to continue the congress. The congress then adjourned indefinitely, marking the *de facto* breakup of the nationwide party organization. This left each of the republic party organizations to respond independently to conditions in its own region. It also left the military (the Yugoslav People's Army, or JNA) the only organization still committed to, and dependent on, the continued survival of the federation.

The electoral victories of independence-oriented coalitions in Slovenia and Croatia in the spring of 1990, and the former Communists' victory in Serbia in December of that year, deepened political divisions among the regional leaderships of the Yugoslav federation. At the same time, political support for maintaining the federation evaporated almost completely. Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic's attempt to create a countrywide political party committed to preserving the federation, for example, generated little support. And his effort to accelerate the holding of free elections for the federal parliament as a means of democratizing and legitimizing the federation failed completely.

In August 1990, Serbs in the central Dalmatian region of Croatia began an open insurrection against the Zagreb government. Already fearful of the nationalist campaign themes of the governing Croatian Democratic Community, and mindful of the violently anti-Serb character of the most recent episodes of extreme Croatian nationalism, the Serbs of Dalmatia viewed the government's effort to disarm ethnically Serb local police forces and replace them with special Croatian police units as a portent of further repression to come.

The Dalmatian Serbs declared their intention to remain part of a common Yugoslav state or, alternatively, to become an independent Serb republic. Their uprising should have been a clear warning to all concerned: the republic borders established by the Communist regime in the postwar period were extremely vulnerable to challenges from ethnic communities that did not share the identity on which new, nationalist post-Communist governments sought to legitimate themselves. Such communities were alienated or even threatened by the nationalistic legitimation of these new governments. If existing borders were to be preserved, substantial political guarantees had to be provided for the ethnic minority enclaves in the republics.

The overwhelming declaration of support for a sovereign and independent state by 88 percent of the Slovenian electorate in a December 23, 1990, referendum made the republic's secession look inevitable. The decision by Yugoslav leaders in February 1991 to begin determining how to divide the country's assets among the regions suggested still more clearly that the breakup of the country was at hand. But the threat by the Yugoslav minister of defense in December to use

force to prevent Slovenia or Croatia from seceding signaled the possibility that a breakup of Yugoslavia would not be peaceful.

The most explosive conflict in Yugoslavia has been between the political aspirations of Croats and Serbs, whose historical and imagined national homelands and claims to sovereignty overlap. This is the conflict that destabilized the interwar regime and threatened to destabilize the Communist government in 1971. In December of that year, the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito, used the military to suppress the mass nationalist movement and to purge the leadership in Croatia. As a result, in the 1980s Croatian Communist leaders remained more conservative than their Slovenian counterparts. More important, because Croatian leaders traced their origins to the anti-nationalist purges of the early 1970s, they enjoyed little popular legitimacy. With the breakup of the Yugoslav Communist party in January 1990 and the onset of competitive elections in the republics, they were decisively defeated by the Croatian Democratic Union, a nationalist coalition led by Franjo Tuđman. The CDU's electoral victory polarized relations between Croats and Serbs in that republic and set the stage for a renewed confrontation between Croat and Serb nationalisms.

## THE BATTLE OVER THE ETHNIC MAP

By 1990, definition of the emerging post-Communist order became the object of open conflict among several competing, and even mutually contradictory, nationalist visions. The Serbian vision allowed for two fundamentally different outcomes: either the federation would be sufficiently strengthened to assure the protection of Serb populations everywhere in the country, or the dissolution of the federation would be accompanied by the redrawing of boundaries to incorporate Serb populations in a single, independent Serb state. This did not preclude the accommodation of the Slovenian vision of an entirely independent Slovenian state, but it did contradict Croatian aspirations for an independent state defined by the borders inherited from the old regime.

Serb and Croat nationalist aspirations might both still have been accommodated by creating independent states that exercised sovereignty over their respective ethnic territories. But such a solution would have required the redrawing of existing borders that would call into question the continued existence of Bosnia as a multinational state of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. Moreover, any agreement openly negotiated by Serbia that legitimated claims to self-determination based on the current ethnic composition of local populations would strengthen the Albanian case for an independent Kosovo, and raise the prospect for Serbia of either giving up that province peacefully or having to escalate the level of repression.

The increasing autonomy of the republics and the

growing interregional conflict stimulated fears among Serb nationalists that large portions of the Yugoslav Serb community might be "cut off" from Serbia. The repeated use of military force to suppress Albanian demonstrations in Kosovo in the 1980s, and changes in the Serbian constitution that revoked provincial autonomy, suggested that Milosevic and other Serb nationalists might take similar actions in retaliation for any effort to separate the Serb populations of either Croatia or Bosnia from Serbia. At the very least it suggested that any claim by Croats or Muslims to the right of national self-determination would lead to Serb demands for self-determination, and for the redrawing of internal borders to permit the consolidation of Serb-populated territories under the authority of a single Serbian national state.

Serbs, however, were not the only ethnic group in the former Yugoslavia that might exploit the redrawing of borders. Albanians in Kosovo had already declared their independence and adopted their own constitution in the summer and fall of 1990. Redrawing borders might lead them to claim several western counties of Macedonia where ethnic Albanians constituted the majority or a plurality of the local population. They might even lay claim to the bordering Serbian county of Presevo, where ethnic Albanians also constituted the majority. Radical nationalist elements in Kosovo had already called for the unification of all ethnically Albanian territories. Similarly, Muslim nationalists in Bosnia might lay claim to the several counties of the Sandzak region that lie across the Serbian-Montenegrin border in which Muslims make up the majority.

### AN INEPT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

A narrow window of opportunity to negotiate a peaceful solution to the growing dispute among the republics and to address the demands raised by ethnic communities appeared to remain open until March 1991. The West's inaction in late 1990 and early 1991 can be partly attributed to preoccupation on the part of western European leaders with negotiations over European integration. Collective action through the European Community was further stymied by clear differences in perspective among the British, French, and Germans. United States policymakers, on the other hand, consciously chose to distance themselves from the issue. United States inaction may even have been due to a cynical calculation on the part of Secretary of State James Baker that this conflict should be left for the Europeans to handle, precisely because the difficulty of the issues and the internal divisions among them assured that they would fail, thus reaffirming the need for American leadership in Europe.

As noted earlier, the attention of Western policymakers was also diverted by two other issues: the military effort to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the

continuing political crisis in the Soviet Union. Any effort to facilitate the breakup of Yugoslavia appeared to have been precluded by fear that it might create an undesirable precedent for the Soviet Union. As a result, the political responses of the United States and other Western states to events in both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia ignored the fundamental commitments to human rights for which they had pressed in meetings of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) for more than a decade. Yugoslav policy was shaped almost entirely by the desire to preserve the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union.

Western states remained firmly committed to the status quo in Yugoslavia. No effort was made to encourage Yugoslav leaders to hold the federation together by devising new political arrangements that addressed the special interests and concerns of the territorially compact communities of ethnic minorities in the republics. Even more important, in an unprecedented and ill-advised extension of the Helsinki principles of territorial integrity and the inviolability of state borders, the West extended its political support to the borders between the republics of the Yugoslav federation. Neither the United States nor its European partners acknowledged that the growing nationalism of the various peoples of Yugoslavia not only called into question the survival of the federation—they also raised doubts about the political viability of multiethnic republics. The same principle of self-determination that the Slovenes and Croats might use to justify their independence could also be used to justify Dalmatian Serbs' demands for separation from Croatia. Moreover, any reference to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity to defend the Croats' claims to Croatia could be used just as easily by Serbs in Belgrade to justify defending the integrity of the former Yugoslavia. International actors made no attempt, however, to confront these issues. They failed to address the growing probability that the Serbian leadership in Belgrade and its Serb allies in the military would use the JNA either to prevent the secession of Slovenia and Croatia or to detach Serb-populated territories of Croatia and Bosnia and annex them to Serbia.

By taking a more comprehensive approach, the international community might have been able to mediate among the several contradictory values and goals of local actors. Extreme demands for the right to self-determination on the part of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia might have been counterbalanced, for example, by Serbian concerns that adoption of the principle of the right to self-determination might lead to the loss of Kosovo. Croatian ambitions with respect to western Herzegovina might similarly have been moderated by the desire to hold on to the Krajina region.

Under these circumstances, it might have been possible to achieve an overall settlement based on

trade-offs among the parties involved. But such an approach would have required the international community to place the peaceful settlement of conflicting demands for self-determination above the principle of territorial integrity of states. At the very least, it would have required the United States and the European Community to abandon their support for the borders of the republics as the basis for establishing new states within the boundaries of the former Yugoslavia. However, this approach stood the best chance of success before the cycle of interethnic violence had set in. By mid-1991 it already was too late.

### THE LESSONS OF YUGOSLAVIA

The wars in the former Yugoslavia have made it clear that the principles and practices that provided a stable framework for international security in the era of the cold war are no longer sufficient to preserve the peace. The principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights, and self-determination embedded in the United Nations Charter and other United Nations documents, and developed in detail in the documents of the CSCE, have proved contradictory, or at least subject to contradictory interpretation. Moreover, the mounting human tragedy in Bosnia has revealed the inadequacies of the decision-making principles, operational guidelines, and conflict-management capabilities of Euro-Atlantic institutions such as the CSCE, NATO, and the European Community, as well as the UN.

New diplomatic and political mechanisms must be developed to cope with demands for self-determination in ways that do not undermine the basic foundation of international stability—the system of sovereign states. The development of such mechanisms requires reconsideration of the meaning of self-determination in the contemporary era and the careful reconsideration of the indivisibility of state sovereignty. At the very least, it requires limiting the ability of states to use their claim to sovereignty to shield abuses from international inquiry. For any mechanisms to be effective, however, individual states and international organizations alike must become more proactive, undertaking preventive diplomatic and political efforts to solve interethnic and other conflicts before they threaten international peace.

International engagement in the Yugoslav crisis as early as 1990 would have remained futile if the Western states had continued to refuse to support the redrawing of borders as a possible path to a peacefully

negotiated solution to the crisis. The declaration of independence by a territorially compact ethnic community, such as that of the Serbs in Croatia or any other group in Yugoslavia, could have been recognized as a legitimate demand for self-determination. By recognizing the equal rights of all peoples in the country to self-determination, international mediators might have been able to lead local actors toward mutual concessions. The key to such negotiations, however, lay in the recognition that international principles, and the rights derived from them, were equally applicable to all parties, as well as in a willingness to undertake the renegotiation of borders. This the international community failed to do.

Early insistence by outside powers on the democratic legitimization of existing borders might have encouraged greater concern for the protection of human rights and avoided the escalation of ethnic tensions in Croatia and Bosnia. The Communist order that held Yugoslavia together began to disintegrate as early as 1986. It entered into crisis in December 1989. This left sufficient opportunity for international actors to influence events. The importance in such a situation of clearly and forcefully articulating and enforcing the human rights standards to which states seeking recognition will be held cannot be overemphasized. By doing so international actors may affect popular perceptions and politics. In Yugoslavia, for example, the regional elections held in 1990 might have produced more moderate governments if the human rights standards of potential ruling parties had been at issue.

The existence of competing claims to territory complicated the Yugoslav crisis. But it does not by itself account for the magnitude of human destruction that has occurred. The extreme violence in Yugoslavia must also be attributed to the establishment of ethnically defined governments that failed to provide democratic safeguards for the human rights of minority communities. This reinforces the conclusion that if the international community is to facilitate the peaceful settlement of such conflicts elsewhere, it must devise the means to prevent ethnic domination and safeguard human rights. In short, the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national self-determination must be integrated into a single framework for determining the legitimacy of claims to political authority. And that framework must be based on the superiority of principles of human rights and democracy. ■

Bosnia has come to be seen—depending on one's point of view—as either a startling example of international impotence or a violent civil war not amenable to outside interference. For Robin Remington the conflict represents something else: "In Bosnia the specter of the First World War is haunting the New Europe. Whether that specter is a waning shadow from the past or a harbinger of the future remains an open question. . . ."

## Bosnia: The Tangled Web

BY ROBIN ALISON REMINGTON

For author Susan Sontag, Bosnia is "the Spanish Civil War of our time, only now we are all witnesses."<sup>1</sup> The nightly news brings Sarajevo, city of sorrows, under siege, with hundreds of thousands of residents living in basements and waiting for Godot. Mostar, its people starving, is a battleground for Bosnian Muslims and their former Croat allies. Villages throughout the country have been ravaged by so-called "ethnic cleansing."

In the tragedy that has struck this once peaceful, multi-ethnic republic of the former Yugoslavia, there are no accurate body counts. The July 31 *New York Times* put the figure at 200,000 dead, most of them civilians, including the victims of the detention camps and the children dying for lack of medical supplies. There has been mass rape. More than 2 million people are homeless: some 573,000 refugees sinking the already foundering economies of Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and 640,000

others destabilizing neighboring countries, the rest moving from town to town ahead of shifting battle lines. The number of people who have been killed or left homeless is on a scale not seen in Europe since the Second World War.

Can one separate out the revulsion and anger to consider the political dynamics of the region and the international options? For Bosnia facts are less important than the tangled web of contradictory realities of those doing the shooting and those being killed, their patrons among the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, and the international actors attempting to stop or at least contain the war in Bosnia.

For policymakers Bosnia is a painful dilemma, an ever-present reminder of the failure of the international system after the cold war to make the transition to a "New World Order." For scholars Bosnia is an analytical nightmare of conflicting historical claims, political agendas, and strategic ambitions; not surprisingly, differences among interpretations are legion. My own analysis is based on ongoing research looking at the role played by rising nationalisms, the legacy of communism, and international bungling in the disintegration of what was once Yugoslavia and in the subsequent wars within and among the successor states.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>As negotiators in Geneva pressed forward with the plan for a three-way ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Washington threatened air strikes against Bosnian Serbs while NATO and the UN sorted out who would give the command to attack, Sontag was in Sarajevo directing Samuel Beckett's play *Waiting for Godot*, a metaphor for international intervention to save the city—which so far has not materialized. See *The New York Times*, August 19, 1993.

<sup>2</sup>Robin Alison Remington, "Stumbling into War: Collapse of the Yugoslav Alternative" (Paper presented to a Hendricks Symposium on the Legacies of Communism, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, October 1-2, 1992) and "Ethnonationalism and the Integrity of the Sovereign State: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia" (Paper delivered at the conference on "Race, Ethnicity, and Nationalism at the End of the Twentieth Century," University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, September 30-October 2, 1993).

### HISTORY, MYTH, AND NATION

As citizens of a nation of immigrants, most Americans have a hard time comprehending the eastern European conception of nation and the mobilizing force of national identity. They tend to equate American nationalism with patriotism and to view the nationalism of competing states and societies as dangerous or unfair. On a visceral level, Americans feel that "our" nationalism is good and "their" nationalism bad.

Hence the tendency to consider the nationalism of western European positive and modern, while the eastern European version is seen as a dangerous

mixture of myths hanging on from the past and aggressive ambitions casting a shadow over the future.

To counter this parochialism, one needs to start from Hans Kohn's premise that "nationalism is a state of mind." A nation is a collection of individuals who by self-definition have become a nation and who think of themselves as locked into a shared fate for historical, linguistic, or religious reasons. Ethnonationalism is something more than "conscious or organized ethno-cultural solidarity"; the political dimension of solidarity needs to be emphasized in order to focus on what defines the nature of relations between "us" and "them." This is particularly important.

With Bosnia and Herzegovina, an understanding of the history and national identities of the three ethnic groups locked in combat there is essential to understanding the causes of war and the chances for peace. Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims are not separated by ethnic differences so much as by their histories and religious beliefs. The first (1918–1941) and second (1945–1991) Yugoslav attempts at state-building brought together southern Slav nations that for centuries had disappeared from the map of Europe after being incorporated into the Habsburg (subsequently Austro-Hungarian) or Ottoman Empires. Much like the nations of Asia and Africa, these Yugoslav states had to cope with the legacy of conflicting imperialisms, arbitrary boundaries, and substantially different political cultures, and with the incompatible hopes and fears of major groups in society. In 1918 Croats and Serbs spoke what linguists consider to be the same language, although they used different scripts for writing it; their common language, however, could not bridge differences in religion, cultural orientation, attitudes toward authority, and political and military behavior.

<sup>3</sup>Although the Western media and international mediators have focused on the dangers of aggression in the cause of "Greater Serbia," memories of past glories mingle with present-day aspirations in Croatia as well. In his interview with Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, Steve Coll describes the picture of King Tomislav in battle armor above Tuđman's desk, as well as the picture in the lobby of Croatian knights riding through a conquered village past bodies of decapitated Turkish Muslims, celebrated by angels displaying a banner bearing the legend "Glory and Victory." See *The Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, March 8–14, 1993, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup>Joseph C. Harsch, "Back to the Future in the Balkans," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 29, 1992.

<sup>5</sup>In 1881 the military frontier was incorporated into Croatia, thereby changing the demographic composition of this part of the empire so that Serbs became the largest national minority, comprising about one-quarter of the population. See H. C. Darby, "Croatia," in Stephen Clissold, ed., *A Short History of Yugoslavia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 38. This is the origin of the Serb minority in Croatia and of conflicting claims to the Krajina region. See also Alex N. Dragnich, *Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992).

The golden age of Croatian statehood came in the tenth century, during the time of King Tomislav, who brought Croatia into the Church of Rome.<sup>3</sup> When the Tomislav dynasty failed to produce an appropriate heir, the Croatians signed the Treaty of Zagreb (1102), accepting a Hungarian king. So began Croatian ties to Hungary that endured for more than 800 years.

Croatia's association with Hungary is the basis of a historical-cultural determinism that makes the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991 the first step in a predictable revival of the Austro-Hungarian empire.<sup>4</sup> This interpretation pays no attention to the role of the conflicting political agendas that marked the birth of the first Yugoslav state or to Titoist Yugoslavia's progress in moving beyond the bloodstained memories of World War II. In addition, it underestimates the internal forces for disintegration and fails to consider the behavior of the international community.

Still more fundamental, those who look for a revival of Habsburg structures distort the influence of history on the Eastern Orthodox Serbs. The myth of "Greater Serbia" dates back to the medieval empire of Czar Dusan; Serbia then included, as well as most of Serbia proper, Montenegro, southern Bosnia and Dalmatia, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, and parts of modern Greece. That myth survived the Serbians' defeat by the Ottoman Turks on the Field of the Blackbirds in the battle of Kosovo, fought June 28, 1389. In the course of almost five centuries under the Turks, the Serb population divided into three groups: Serbs of Serbia proper, Bosnian Serbs, and Serbs on the military frontier established by the Habsburgs during the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries; these last received special rights and privileges for serving on the front line in this buffer zone between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires.<sup>5</sup>

Thus Croats and Serbs developed their national identities as nations without a state in the womb of competing empires. During the hundreds of years when they lacked territory or sovereignty, Croatian and Serbian ethnonationalism was the lifeblood of the two nations, ensuring their survival. Unfortunately the memories of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia have become political agendas concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina—although not official government policy—of key politicians in Belgrade and Zagreb. Significant numbers of Serbs in Serbia and Croats in Croatia as well as Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats have massed behind them.

Bosnian Muslims are descendants of Slavic tribes that migrated to the region in the seventh century. Croats, Serbs, and Hungarians all have historic claims in this region. Movement toward some kind of Bosnian national autonomy dates from the twelfth century, but was complicated not only by the schism between eastern and western Christianity but also by the rise of an indigenous Bosnian church denounced as heretical

in both Constantinople and Rome. At the end of the fourteenth century, as the Serbian empire began to decline, Bosnia enjoyed a golden age, during which Stephen Tvrtko—whose ruling uncle had abandoned the Bosnian church for allegiance to Rome—was known successively as king of the Serbs, of Bosnia, and of Dalmatia and Croatia. During the Turkish occupation (1463–1878) the Bosnian church disappeared. Over time many of its believers, along with Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs, converted to Islam, retained their lands, and, as Slav Muslims, became aristocrats under the Turkish conquerors.

In short, there is no Bosnian Muslim age of independence to look back on; only the group's elite status during Turkish times and enhanced constitutional role as a result of the Yugoslav constitution of 1974. Among Bosnian Muslims themselves, as well as among Serbs and Croats, there are those who would argue that all Bosnian Muslims are simply Croats or Serbs who converted to Islam. This is the basis of the position that Bosnian Muslims are an artificial nation, which Tito created perhaps to contain Serb-Croat conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and certainly to serve the cause of Yugoslav nonalignment in the Middle East.

The category "ethnic Muslim" was used by the regime from 1968 on. In the 1981 census some 2 million respondents (9 percent of the total population of Yugoslavia) identified themselves as ethnic Muslims. By 1991 ethnic Muslims made up 44 percent of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as opposed to Serbs (31 percent), Croats (17 percent), Yugoslavs (6 percent), and a very small percentage of other nationalities—before ethnic cleansing changed population ratios in ways yet to be recorded.

## TWO DIFFERENT VISIONS

Not surprisingly, the founders of the first Yugoslav state in 1918 brought very different visions of their relationship into the interwar Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The Croats' bad experiences with limited autonomy under imperial rule led to demands by the Council of Croats and Slovenes for a confederal Yugoslavia in which none of the constituent nations would have precedence. Serbs, on the other hand, saw the new kingdom as the legitimate heir of Czar Dusan's medieval empire.

With the collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, these historical models emerged as conflicting constitutional programs for post-Communist Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia again turned to the idea of a confederal community of nations, along the lines of the European Community.

<sup>6</sup>Robert M. Hayden, "The Partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1990–1993," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Report*, vol. 2, no. 22 (May 18, 1993), p. 3.

Serbs wanted an integrated federation in which the Serb population (roughly 9 million out of 23 million total) would translate into political advantage for them—American in form, Greater Serbia in substance.

In the increasingly polarized political atmosphere, the 1990 multiparty elections in Bosnia brought to power a coalition government of the Muslim Party for Democratic Action (which received 38 percent of the ballots cast), the Serbian Democratic party (27 percent), and the Croatian Democratic Union (15 percent). Robert Hayden has persuasively argued that among the three nationalist parties that dominated the collective presidency, the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat parties (a combined 42 percent of the popular vote) opposed the idea of a unitary state, supported a brand of "autonomy" that was only a euphemism for confederation, and saw this as a transition phase before "unification with the mother state of the ethnonation."<sup>6</sup>

As Yugoslavia collapsed, Bosnian Croats called for an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, or at least one that would be "sovereign" in a confederal Yugoslavia, and Bosnian Muslims supported a "sovereign republic" in a weak federation, which in practice amounted to the confederal vision. Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, wanted the republic to remain in a Yugoslav federation.

## SINS OF THE FATHERS: FROM FASCIST CROATIA TO THE 1990S

Much like the star-crossed interwar kingdom of south Slavs, the Yugoslavia of 1990 could not survive the clash between the incompatible goals of its different major groups. Again problems created by too many parties and too little political cohesion helped to sink Yugoslav efforts at state-building. But this time the collapse must be seen in the context of repercussions from the first failed attempt.

In 1929 King Alexander Karadjordjevic disbanded parliament and established what amounted to a Serbian dictatorship. The king may well have felt he had no choice, given the failure of Slovene representatives to form a government that could deal with gridlock and violence in parliament. Yet many Croatians looked on the imposition of de facto martial law as Serbian colonization of Croatia. A militant Croat resistance movement, the Ustasha, went underground and into exile. The assassination of King Alexander on a trip to France in 1934, and the destruction of the Serb community in Croatia during World War II and ultimately of the multiethnic Bosnia in 1992–1993 were direct or indirect results of these events.

After Hitler dismembered the second Yugoslav state in 1941, the token Independent Kingdom of Croatia, which included Bosnia and Herzegovina, was run by indigenous Croatian Fascists. Ante Pavelic, the leader of the Ustasha, and the movement set the record for

ethnic cleansing by killing an estimated 350,000 to 750,000 Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, and Croats who resisted the slaughter. Men, women, and children were herded into Orthodox churches and burned alive. The death camp at Jasenovac was on the border with Bosnia, and Bosnian Muslims were seen as having collaborated in what Christopher Hitchens, in the September 14, 1992, *Nation*, called "the Serbian Babi Yar." Serbs committed atrocities in retaliation.

In short, Communist Yugoslavia inherited a bloody past of nationalist and communalist hatred. For many Serbs in Bosnia as well as the Serbian minority in Croatia, Ustasha atrocities during World War II were a matter of family history. These memories had been contained in the framework of Yugoslavia's multiethnic federalism. Still, from the mid-1960s, and even more so after Tito died in 1980, failure to create appropriate political machinery for resolving nationalist and ethnic conflict intensified problems stemming from differing levels of economic development in Yugoslavia's republics and regions and a generally low level of political institutionalization.

Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s the "sacrificed generation" of Tito's successors joined and left rotating collective federal presidencies wrestling with the thankless task of stabilizing the faltering economy. (The collective presidency also made it difficult for any individual member to gain name recognition, which had a great effect on politics and statesmanship in the last years of the old Yugoslavia.) Perhaps inevitably, gladiators arose in the various nations contained within Yugoslavia who were all too willing to substitute nationalist and ethnic circuses for bread. Beginning in 1987, Serbian party boss Slobodan Milosevic, well endowed with populist charisma, built up his image as a virtual nationalist icon with promises to return Serbia to its place in the sun and to "protect" ethnic Serbs in Serbia's autonomous province of Kosovo (where they made up only about 10 percent of the population), Croatia and Bosnia.

With the collapse of communism and paralysis in the governing League of Communists of Yugoslavia, elections in 1990 confirmed Milosevic's control of Serbia, carried Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Union into office in Croatia on a wave of national euphoria, and installed a collective presidency in Bosnia and Herzegovina headed by the leader of the Muslim Party for Democratic Action, Alija Izetbegovic.

<sup>7</sup>Who gave orders to whom remains extremely unclear. The army insists it was acting in accordance with decisions of the government and the presidency. See *Narodna Armija* (Belgrade), July 6, 1991. In a closed session of the Federal Executive Council—the proceedings leaked within days—Prime Minister Markovic accused the army of acting on its own in Slovenia. See *Vreme* (Belgrade), September 23, 1991.

The failure at the polls of Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic's Alliance of Reform Forces undermined the prime minister's political effectiveness and made it much less likely that the republics would compromise and stay in the federation. These elections set the stage for the power struggle that culminated June 25, 1991, with the Slovene and Croatian declarations of independence.

## ON THE ROAD TO CIVIL WAR

Once the shooting started, a few days after the declarations, what had begun as a demonstration of federal authority in Slovenia became the first milestone on the road to civil war.<sup>7</sup> In the wake of the Slovene fiasco, local Serb authorities in the self-proclaimed autonomous region of Krajina, Croatia, took the initiative, declaring that they were uniting with the adjacent region of Bosnka Krajina in Bosnia and Herzegovina to form a greater Serbian community.

Hard-liners in the armed forces more and more openly supported Serbian irregulars battling Croatian militia. Dialogue among republic leaders largely ceased, and the Serbian agenda shifted to that of a rump Yugoslavia minus Slovenia and Croatia. The efforts of the multiethnic communities of Bosnia to stay out of war were complicated by the growing presence of Serb and Croat paramilitary groups in the republic, as well as of the Yugoslav armed forces.

These pressures intensified in October 1991 when Montenegrin Vice President Branko Kostic of the collective presidency of Yugoslavia, supported by members from the once autonomous Serbian provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, announced that their half of the presidency was assuming the powers of the federal parliament. (President Stipe Mesic, backed up by the representatives of Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia Herzegovina, denounced this as a coup.) In a vote boycotted by Serb members, Croat and Muslim deputies in the Bosnian parliament declared the republic's independence from any such rump Yugoslavia, thereby abandoning the principle of consensus on which the collective governance was based.

Reportedly German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was convinced that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would teach Milosevic a lesson and blunt his manipulation of atavistic Serb longings to recreate a greater Serbia. Bonn's policy, however, whether intended as a deterrent or a means of containing the conflict, backfired. It was apparently a key factor in the Croatians' decision to blockade and attack Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) garrisons in Croatia in hopes that Germany could be provoked into following through on the promised recognition if Serb insurgents and their JNA supporters continued bombarding Croatian cities. EC- and UN-brokered cease-fires were no more than a


revolving door to the next round of violence. Serbs sought to gain more territory before the fighting stopped, while after the UN arms embargo Croats attacked in search of weapons.

There can be little doubt that the EC's divided agendas and UN foot-dragging directly contributed to pushing Bosnia off the tightrope of negotiations into civil war almost a year after fighting began in Croatia. UN troubleshooter Cyrus Vance and Bosnian President Izetbegovic both warned the EC that this ethnically entangled republic would pay the price if the EC gave in to German pressure for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the arbitrary January 15, 1992, deadline. The Bosnian president's appeal to the UN for assistance to stem rising violence after the republic's declaration of sovereignty and the subsequent demand for constitutional independence by the parliament of Bosnian Serbs was as ineffective as his plea to the Security Council this September to get the Muslims a better deal in the tripartite peace plan on the table in Geneva and to halt ethnic cleansing and the siege of Sarajevo.

If the EC's requirement that any former Yugoslav republic seeking recognition request it by December 23, 1991, and its decision to base its recognition on a referendum had disastrous consequences, American policy was also counterproductive. United States President George Bush and James Baker, his secretary

of state, gave Izetbegovic the false impression that the Muslims might get a better deal if they backed out of the February 1992 Lisbon agreement—which would have given them 44 percent of the country's territory, with roughly 82 percent of the Muslim population coming under Bosnian administrative control. United States policymakers on Bosnia have since admitted their errors in opposing partition of the country in 1992, since after more than a year and a half of war, the latest peace plan would give the Muslims only 30 percent, the Serbs 52 percent (down from the 70 percent under their military control), and the Croats 18 percent of the devastated territory of Bosnia. Meanwhile the costs of stalled negotiations were rising numbers of dead, wounded, and homeless.<sup>8</sup>

In retrospect, internationalization of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia appears to have consistently accelerated the violence rather than containing it. The EC's decision to recognize Croatia before a viable plan for protecting the Serb minority there was in place widened the fighting early; the plan developed by Vance and the EC's Lord Owen that would have di-



<sup>8</sup>Patrick Moore, "Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia: Outrage but Little Action," *RFL / RL Report*, vol. 1, no. 31 (August 28, 1992). As Croat-Muslim fighting, particularly in the Mostar region, intensified over this summer, there have been reports of atrocities in Croat detention camps mingled with Croat complaints that the Western press ignores the plight of thousands of Croat civilians held in Muslim camps. See *The New York Times*, September 9, 1993.

vided Bosnia into ten autonomous regions, made it worse later. For example, a speech April 12 by the Croatian defense minister in the predominantly Muslim town of Travnik insisting that the Croatian flag be flown along with the Bosnian government flag because the Vance-Owen plan assigned this region to a Croat canton, a move that led to collapse of the tactical alliance between Croats and Muslims and to battles between the two for central Bosnia and the town of Mostar. Unlike the civil war in Croatia, it was not Western lack of will on the subject of military intervention so much as German, American, and international negotiators' diplomatic miscalculations that brought the war to Bosnia.

## BOSNIA IN THE DISORDERED NEW WORLD

Bosnia is only one symptom of the reorientation of the international system. The North-South division between haves and have-nots is not only the fault line dividing developing countries from the industrialized world, but is splitting Europe itself. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain, the threat to western European prosperity is no longer communism but a flood of refugees running from war, political dislocation, unemployment, and from economic hardship encountered on the way to market economies.

If there is to be any hope of a united Europe or a new world order, the EC, the UN, and the member states who pay the bills must take a hard look at their own behavior. Unless the European and international actors in the tragedy of Bosnia become more sensitive to their role in perpetuating war, there will be no peace.

The number of international institutions and national governments that must agree on what is to be done before it can be done has become a major part of the problem of stopping the carnage in Bosnia. Any solution must reckon with the European and international negotiators in Geneva; UN commanders and deliverers of humanitarian aid on the ground; Germany, France, and Britain, the European power brokers from the EC and NATO; the United States, both as the only superpower in sight and the godfather of NATO; and the UN Security Council and UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

For Bosnia peace can only come as a healing process, not an agreement. That process will only take place when the warring parties and outside supporters and power brokers accept that all three nations in Bosnia have legitimate interests and fears that must be worked through together. Undoubtedly, even if by some miracle negotiators in Geneva cut a deal that is respected by politicians and official armies, paramilitary and local warlord violence will continue while enforcement measures are put in place.

In Bosnia the specter of the First World War is haunting the New Europe. Whether that specter is a waning shadow from the past or a harbinger of the future remains an open question. However, the initial

## "Agreement Relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina"

*The agreement, based on the Owen-Stoltenberg negotiations, was accepted August 3 in Geneva by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic but was rejected by the Bosnian parliament in Sarajevo September 29; it may well become, however, the basis of any final settlement. The package consists of:*

- A constitutional agreement that would divide Bosnia into three republics (for ethnic Muslims, Serbs, and Croats) under a loose union; this would become the constitution for the country
- A redrawn map of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with areas under the control of the three parties delineated
- Military agreements that would provide for the withdrawal of weaponry as well as for a cease-fire (a cease-fire agreed to August 18 did not go into effect)
- An agreement that Sarajevo would be a UN protectorate for two years

*Note: In a separate declaration, the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs agreed September 16 to allow the Bosnian Serbs to hold a referendum on secession from the union in two years.*

rejection of the Bosnian Muslim parliament of the proposed tripartite partition, combined with the Tudjman government's new conditions for UNPROFOR presence in Croatia beyond November, makes the situation look even darker. ■

"The war in Croatia was not, as is frequently claimed, a spontaneous uprising by Croatian Serbs fearful for their future because of [the new Croatian government's] rhetoric—though some were indeed apprehensive and confused. The war was prepared and coordinated in advance by Belgrade right from the first challenge to the Croat government in August 1990."

## Croatia's Violent Birth

BY CHRISTOPHER CVIIC

**C**roatia has paid dearly for its independence bid. The seven-month war that was fought on its territory in 1991 and 1992 against the combined forces of the Yugoslav army and Serb paramilitaries recruited from Croatian Serbs and volunteers from Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia proper left Croatia with considerable civilian and military casualties (6,574 killed and 23,733 wounded, with 13,788 people listed as missing); substantial material damage, and a significant loss of territory.

According to Croatian government estimates, the war destroyed about 40 percent of Croatia's economic capacity; total damage is an estimated \$13 billion. Some 7,800 miles of roads, or 38 percent of the total road network, were badly damaged. Dozens of important bridges were wrecked, including the bridge at Maslenica near the port of Zadar, which carries the bulk of the tourist traffic to and from Dalmatia, Croatia's most important tourist region. Severe damage was inflicted on other port facilities and airports. Thousands of factories, schools, hospitals, and churches were deliberately targeted for artillery or aerial attacks. Nearly a third of Croatia's territory—including some of the richest agricultural land and areas with large oil wells—is under Serb control. The Serbs also control part of the Zagreb-Split railway that links Dalmatia with the rest of the country, and they occupy a section of the old Zagreb-Belgrade highway, thus cutting off Zagreb, the capital, from eastern Croatia.

As of March, Croatia was host to and chiefly responsible for the care of 252,684 displaced persons from Croatian territory occupied by the Serbs, and 371,376 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina—a considerable burden for a country of 4.6 million

people. Approximately 20 percent of the refugees from Bosnia were Bosnian Croats and about 80 percent Bosnian Muslims. Until recently some 70,000 Bosnian refugees were housed in hotels on the Adriatic coast and on the islands offshore, but most are now being relocated to the interior of the country to make way for the tourists who are trickling back to Croatia. However, continued Serb shelling of Croat coastal and inland towns is deterring visitors from abroad—as is, of course, the continuing war in Bosnia. Income from tourism, Croatia's important hard-currency earner, is rising and will offer a shortcut to recovery but it is picking up only slowly from its low point in 1991, when it had sunk to about one-tenth of what it was before the war.

To rebuild its infrastructure and resume normal economic activity, Croatia needs the occupied territories returned. Without them it remains crippled. Yet it is by no means certain that it will have them back in the foreseeable future. Indeed, many people in Croatia think that there will be another war with Serbia—once the war in Bosnia is over—and that war will determine Croatia's final borders. Not everyone shares that view and, indeed, a war is still only possible, not probable. Even without more fighting, Croatia's economic and political prospects remain uncertain.

What led to this brutal war in Croatia in 1991—which has been followed by one even more brutal in Bosnia? Could the parting of ways in Yugoslavia—if it had to happen—have been a peaceful one like that between Sweden and Norway in 1905? The tragic events that have taken place in Croatia and Bosnia are of course part of the transition from communism to post-communism, a transition that was expected to be particularly difficult in a multinational country such as Yugoslavia. However, in view of the peaceful nature of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and most of the Soviet Union, it is necessary to inquire deeper into the circumstances of Yugoslavia's violent demise. For a fuller understanding of Croatia's role in the federation's disintegration, as well as a clearer picture of its future,

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we need to examine the Croats' extremely complex relationship with Yugoslavia and, especially, its largest ethnic group: the Serbs.

## THE CROATS AND YUGOSLAVIA

In post-1945 Yugoslavia, the Croats were the country's second-largest ethnic group and, like the Serbs, one of its most dissatisfied—though for opposite reasons. The Serbs' chief (if not always openly stated) reason for dissatisfaction with Communist Yugoslavia was that they no longer enjoyed the hegemony they had in the centralist, royalist Yugoslavia that existed between 1918 and 1941. When it was rebuilt by the Communists under Marshal Josip Broz Tito's leadership in 1945, Yugoslavia adopted a federal system that split the state into six republics, and Serbia itself into three parts: Serbia proper and the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Hence the Serbs' rejection of Yugoslavia and their attempt in the late 1980s to reshape it once again as a centralized state under their direction—by force if need be.

For the Croats, the Yugoslavia that existed in the early twentieth century was a deep disappointment. The state Tito created became more acceptable as time went on, but improvement came too late and did not prove sufficient. Ironically, before the first Yugoslavia was ever formed, many prominent Croats were among the most fervent supporters of the Yugoslav idea. In 1918, after Austria-Hungary's collapse, the Croats were happy to exchange for a new southern Slav union their centuries-old but increasingly uncomfortable association with an ever more aggressively nationalist Hungary within Austria-Hungary. In 1918, union with Serbia—a member of the victorious coalition that fought Germany—within a new southern Slav state had a special attraction since it also seemed to offer protection against Italy. Under the 1915 Treaty of London, Italy had been promised by Britain, France, and Russia most of Croatia's Adriatic coast as an inducement to join the war on the allied side. When the war ended, Italy proceeded with the occupation of the specified territories.

The new southern Slav government in Belgrade failed to stop Italy from acquiring much of the territory promised under the Treaty of London. Even more important, the Croats not only failed to achieve equality with the Serbs but their situation actually was worse than it had been during the Austro-Hungarian reign. Under the Hapsburgs, Croatia had always retained a certain modest degree of autonomy as one of the empire's "historic" peoples. Croatia's autonomous status was given a modern form in an agreement reached with Hungary in 1868, a year after a similar Austro-Hungarian agreement. None of this was carried over into the new southern Slav state, which adopted the centralist French model and in 1929 became a

personal dictatorship under King Alexander Karadjordjevic.

In August 1939, Croatia was made an autonomous unit within Yugoslavia. Reached by the government of Dragisa Cvetkovic and Vladko Macek, leader of the Croatian Peasant party, the new status was supported by the Serb minority in Croatia, the so-called *precani* ("people from the other side," as the Serbs in Serbia called them), who had grown to mistrust the rapacious and corrupt government in Belgrade and saw their interests better protected by Zagreb. However, the Cvetkovic-Macek agreement was undermined by the vehement rejection by the Serb public in Serbia. The democratic opposition in Serbia proper came out against it, as well as the Serbian Orthodox Church, which had, two years before, successfully torpedoed a proposed concordat with the Vatican that would have given the Roman Catholic Church equal status with the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The Croats' search for territorial autonomy and for full recognition of traditional Croat identity was inspired by their sense of insecurity about the Serbs. The Croats felt even more threatened by the possibility of "Serbianization" (disguised as campaigns for "Yugoslavism") than by "Germanization" or "Magyarization" while part of Austria-Hungary. In Yugoslavia before 1941, the ideological basis for this Yugoslav "unitarism" was the theory that the Croats, the Serbs, and the Slovenes (nobody then talked of Macedonians and Bosnian Muslims as separate entities) were three sections, or "tribes" (*plemena*), of one "Yugoslav" people. Paradoxically, the linguistic closeness of the southern Slavs, instead of forming a basis for a more harmonious common life than that with the not-so-close non-Slavs—such as the Germans, the Hungarians, or the Italians—turned out to be divisive factor, since it brought with it the threat of assimilation. That threat was perceived as real in Croat eyes. They noted the Serbs' widespread acceptance of the views of the nineteenth-century linguistic reformer, Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic, who defined as Serbs all those who speak the central-south Slavic dialect (*Stokavian*)—among them the vast majority of Catholic Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Vuk's ideas, which before 1918 had also been accepted by many prominent pro-Yugoslav Croat linguists, served to reinforce the official concept adopted after 1918 of a single Yugoslav nation made up of three "tribes." But an ever-increasing number of Croats came to see Vuk's ideology as a backdoor to the "Serbianization" of the country's non-Serbs.

## THE COMMUNISTS' TURN

In 1945 Croatia became one of the republics of the Yugoslav Communist federation. Equality was what, at least on paper, the post-1945 Tito Yugoslavia offered to its republics in contrast to the pre-1941 one that had been based on Serb supremacy. The promise of na-

tional equality had helped Tito's Partisans gain extra support during World War II, but after their victory in 1945 reality proved different. Yugoslavia was to be a centralist state run by the Communist party and its leader, Tito. But elements of Serb supremacy reappeared in the new, supposedly internationalist-minded Yugoslav regime. This resulted from Tito's need to appease the Serbs in the immediate post-1945 period. As part of that policy, Tito deliberately played down the vociferous denunciations of pre-1941 Serb "hegemonism." The reason for Tito's tactics was clear.

During Germany's wartime occupation of Serbia, the majority of Serbs backed General Draza Mihailovic, leader of the royalist Chetniks. The Chetniks hoped to restore the country to the prewar, strongly Serbian-flavored kingdom and strongly opposed the idea of the Yugoslav federation proposed by Tito's Communists. Tito never won the allegiance of the Serbs in Serbia during the war (in contrast to the mainly rural Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia who joined the Partisans to escape the murderous puppet regime of Ante Pavelic that the Nazis had installed). Belgrade and the rest of Serbia were conquered in October 1944 by the Red Army aided by Tito's Partisans—not the other way round.

Tito, therefore, needed to build a power base in a largely hostile Serbia after he came to power. The Serbians held against him the fact that he, half-Croat and half-Slovene, had not only dethroned the Serbian Karadjordjevic dynasty in 1945 but had also had Draza Mihailovic tried and shot as a Nazi collaborator in 1946. To appease the Serbians, Tito espoused Yugoslav "unitarism," which directly and indirectly favored the revival of Serbian influence—especially in the army, the police, the federal civil service, and the diplomatic corps. This policy was also reflected in apparently small but significant decisions such as publishing the official party daily *Borba* in Belgrade in the *ekavian* (Serbian) version of the official Serbo-Croat language (though in the Latin, not Cyrillic, script). Also in 1945, the Serbian variant of Serbo-Croat was made the official language of command in the Yugoslav army.

<sup>1</sup>The controversial question of the exact number of people killed in occupied Yugoslavia during World War II is treated remarkably objectively in two studies. The first is *Zrtve drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* [Victims of the second world war in Yugoslavia] by a Serbian author, Bogoljub Kocovic (London: Nase Delo, 1985) and the second *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* [Losses of the population of Yugoslavia in the second world war] by a Croat population expert, Vladimir Jerjavic (Zagreb: Yugoslav Victimological Society, 1989). The most frequently quoted official figure for Yugoslavia's total population losses during the war was for many years 1.7 million. According to Kocovic's calculations, however, Yugoslavia lost 1,014,000 people (5.9 percent of the total population) between 1941 and 1945. Serb losses were 487,000 (6.9 percent), Croat 207,000 (5.4 percent), Bosnian Muslim 86,000 (6.8 percent), Jewish 60,000 (77.9 percent) and Gypsy 27,000 (31.4 percent).

But the bargain did not last. The late 1950s and early 1960 saw Yugoslavia obliged to look for alternatives to Soviet-style centralism in all spheres of public life. The fight against centralism in the economic sphere but also in the political was led by the industrialized republics of Croatia and Slovenia. The struggle against centralism extended to other fields as well, including the sensitive issue of national equality. After 1966 the post-1945 "unitarism" came under strong attack from most of Yugoslavia's non-Serbs—the Croats in particular.

In the fight against Belgrade, however, Croatia was politically handicapped by the appalling heritage of the wartime Pavelic regime. There was an element of irony in this in view of the Croats' massive participation in the wartime anti-fascist struggle (Pavelic's Ustasha movement was minuscule before it was put in power in 1941, and only a minority of Croats sided with the Ustasha).

Nevertheless, the embattled centralists (as well as those among the Serbian non-Communist nationalist opposition who hoped for the restoration of Serbian hegemony) found it politically convenient to undermine the position of the Croats by not only harping on but even exaggerating the numbers of the Pavelic regime's victims. For example, the notorious Pavelic death camp in Jasenovac, where some 60,000 to 70,000 people (not all of them Serbs) were killed between 1941 and 1945, was said to have claimed the lives of 700,000 Serbs alone.<sup>1</sup> The exaggerations had a clear political purpose: they were meant to prove that Pavelic and his Ustasha movement enjoyed mass support among the Croats.

The advantage of this tactic was that it made it possible to characterize various anti-centralist démarches from Zagreb—whether political, economic, or even cultural—as "separatism," "nationalist extremism," and a threat to the official "brotherhood-and-unity" policy. This was demonstrated in the case of initiatives such as the famous "Language Declaration" of 1967. Signed on behalf of 18 Croat cultural institutions by 140 prominent scholars, writers, and other intellectuals, the declaration demanded constitutional recognition and full equality for four languages—Croatian, Macedonian, Serbian, and Slovene. Most Croats rejected Serbo-Croatian as a manifestation of official "Yugoslav unitarism," a "political" language par excellence. The declaration caused a bitter public row and many of its signatories were expelled from the party. An orthographic handbook produced in 1971 by leading Croat grammarians for use in schools and offices was branded "chauvinist" and "separatist" the following year and the entire printing of 40,000 copies was ordered burned—as if it were an urban guerrilla handbook.

## THE LAST STRAW

This happened at the height of the purge in Croatia that President Tito had ordered at the end of 1971, and which formed part of a larger all-Yugoslav crackdown on "liberals" and "technocrats." The purge was particularly harsh in Croatia. The new leaders installed by Tito completely crushed the "Croatian Spring," a political and national revival ushered in by the sacking in July 1966 of Alexander Rankovic, a hard-liner from Serbia who was for many years the party's cadre secretary and head of the secret police. The massive purge had a stultifying effect on political and cultural life in Croatia—not unlike that the suppression of the 1968 "Prague Spring" had on Czechoslovakia. The Western media, quietly encouraged by Western governments, played down both the extent and the harshness of Tito's purge in the interests of maintaining Tito's ties to the West.<sup>2</sup>

In the wake of the purge, thousands of Croatians were expelled from the party and lost their posts, with only a few matching losses among the (admittedly few) Serb supporters of the "Croatian Spring." Anti-Serbian feeling in Croatia was further fueled by the fact that the deeply unpopular and insecure leaders Tito had installed in Croatia after his crackdown were obliged to rely heavily on the "faithful" Serbian party cadres in the implementation of their repressive policy.

One of the most negative long-term effects of Tito's purge was the deepening of mistrust between the majority Croat population and the Serb minority, which destroyed the possibility of reviving the pre-1941 anti-Belgrade alliance between Croats and *prečani* Serbs. Perhaps inevitably, the Croats' instinctive response to Tito's purge, which they considered a full-scale attack on their basic national identity, was to concentrate on defending those things that seemed to be in particular danger—such as the national symbols, the Croat language and culture, and so on. Unfortunately, there was nothing there for Croatia's Serbs to identify with. They felt left out and, with memories of Pavelic's extremist brand of Croat nationalism still fresh in their minds, apprehensive about the future.

This growing Croat-Serb rift, set against the background of increasing Croat rejection of Yugoslavia, was one reason why there was no joint Croat-Serb struggle for democracy and civil rights in Croatia or Yugoslavia. While more and more Croats were coming to reject Yugoslavia, most Serbs (including supporters of democratic change) continued to take its continued existence for granted—whatever their own particular criticisms of Yugoslavia from the Serbian national point

of view. Among the Croats, the increasing emphasis on the purely "national" aspects of the anti-regime struggle led to a de-emphasis of democracy, pluralism, and civil rights as the struggle's principal aims. (This was in contrast to the situation, for example, in nationally homogenous Slovenia, where early democratic initiatives in favor of greater Slovene autonomy in Yugoslavia were matched by "non-national" ones arising from concerns with the environment, anti-militarism, sexual freedom, and other "civil" issues.)

Croatia's growing preoccupation with the "national question" in the wake of the 1971–1972 purge, accompanied by the steady growth of anti-Yugoslavia and pro-independence sentiment, found delayed expression in Croatia's first multiparty election since World War II in April 1990. The election was won overwhelmingly by the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU), a right-of-center movement emphasizing the national issue and presenting itself to the electorate as "the most Croat party." Its leader, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, a historian and former general in the Yugoslav army, appealed to his fellow Croats to look on him as the indispensable champion of Croatia in the struggle to refute various anti-Croat "black legends" in recent history, notably the one about the Croats as a "genocidal nation." Sacked in 1967 from the post of head of the party history institute in Zagreb for his attempts to correct what he saw as anti-Croat bias in official pronouncements about World War II, Tudjman was later twice arrested and sentenced: in 1972 to two years' imprisonment for "counter-revolutionary nationalism," and in 1981 to three years' imprisonment and a five-year ban on all public activity for giving "hostile" interviews to the Western media about the situation in Croatia.

## THE ROAD TO WAR

That 1990 election took place a week after the conclusion of Slovenia's first multiparty election. Under the moderate, reformist Communist leadership of Milan Kucan, Slovenia had been experimenting for several years with political pluralism and already enjoyed a quasi-party system. In contrast, Croatia had only a short time to prepare for democracy. There was little political talent available, thanks to the Communist policy of "negative selection" that operated particularly effectively in Croatia. The unpopular party leaders installed by Tito after 1972 were in the end replaced but so late that their more reform- and "Croat"-minded successors did not have time to produce a new image—except for changing the party's name. This meant that the opposition party able and willing to challenge the Communists' dismal record in Croatia and offer itself as an effective alternative trustee of Croatia's national interest stood a good chance of winning.

The largest and best-organized alternative to the reformed Communists proved to be Tudjman's CDU.

<sup>2</sup>A good example of this was the headline, "Tito's Democratic Purge," which appeared in an article in the London *Times* in December 1971 that was written by the paper's diplomatic correspondent and obviously based on an official government briefing.

The party had been operating illegally for about a year and had branches in all the municipalities—not only in Croatia but also among the Croats in Bosnia and Vojvodina as well as those in the West. By being first in the field and presenting themselves to the exiled Croats as the spokesmen for the true Croat national interest, Tudjman and his CDU colleagues managed to secure considerable hard-currency financial support, which gave them a major advantage over the other parties.

Many of the overseas Croats who gave Tudjman's party particularly generous funds came from those who had emigrated to Canada and the United States from the poor but strongly Catholic and nationalist region of Herzegovina in the south of the Bosnian republic. The Herzegovina Croats were strong supporters of the idea of joining Croatia and hoped that Tudjman might help them achieve that aim. When Croatia was attacked in 1991, many Croats living in Herzegovina crossed over into Croatia to serve in the Croatian army, where they were joined by many Croat Herzegovinians who had returned from abroad. Here, in this relationship between Tudjman and his Herzegovina backers, lies the basis of the power of the so-called "Herzegovina lobby" in Croat politics. The Herzegovina Croats have also used their influence in Croatia to promote their economic interests and have become powerful and highly influential in business.

Given everything that had happened before—especially since the "Croatian Spring"—it was not surprising that the question of Croatia's relationship to the Yugoslav state dominated the 1990 election. All other issues—including those concerning the introduction of the market economy—took a second place. Tudjman's CDU campaigned vigorously ("Let us decide ourselves the destiny of our own Croatia") for an affirmation of Croat "identity and sovereignty" in a Yugoslav confederation or "alliance of states." Without explicitly calling for independence and the immediate dismantling of Yugoslavia—as some others in the election campaign did—Tudjman made it clear that, if he were elected, Croatia would operate on an independent basis within a radically reorganized Yugoslavia. The most controversial features of the campaign were Tudjman's statements criticizing Serbian cadres' preponderance in Croatia and, even more controversially, hints at a possible division of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia along the lines of the 1939 Cvetkovic-Macek agreement. Any idea of border changes among Yugoslavia's six republics was rejected by most other parties, including the Coalition for National Accord,

whose prominent figures included the former popular Croat party leaders sacked by Tito in 1971, Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar.

The election, a cross between an anti-Communist plebiscite and a Croat national rally, was won handsomely by Tudjman's CDU, with the reformed Communists coming in second and the Coalition far behind. The CDU won 205 out of 356 seats in the tricameral Croatian parliament, with a majority in each of the three chambers. Croatia's Serbs voted either for the reformed Communists or for the small but vocal nationalist Serbian Democratic party led by a Zadar psychiatrist, Dr. Jovan Raskovic. Opinion polls carried out during the campaign showed that the majority of Croatian Serbs strongly opposed plans for converting the Yugoslav federation into a loose confederation and that they rejected the very idea of Croatia's independence. Among the Croat voters, an important factor in wanting a loose confederation was resentment at the Serbian political and propaganda offensive, then in full swing, initiated by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. That resentment grew rapidly into an overwhelming desire to break loose from Belgrade forever—a desire that found expression in the overwhelmingly pro-independence referendum result in Croatia in May 1991 that closely matched a similar Slovenian referendum the previous December.

In Serbia the public reaction to the CDU's victory and the (also nationalist) Democratic United Opposition of Slovenia's electoral success in that republic was one of fear but not surprise. The Milosevic regime's propaganda organs—particularly TV Belgrade—had already succeeded in convincing the majority in Serbia that both republics were living up to their worst expectations, particularly Croatia, where President Tudjman, an ex-Partisan, was represented as hardly better than the notorious Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic. This public support was essential to Milosevic and his allies among the Yugoslav army generals who were planning their campaign to reconquer Yugoslavia—or at least as much of it as could be had in the first instance.<sup>3</sup>

In January 1991, the Yugoslav army, which had at the time of the 1990 election in Croatia managed quietly to disarm the republic's territorial defense forces, tried to prevent the self-arming of Croatia. This led to a state crisis, the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia on June 25, 1991, and eventually war, first in Slovenia and then in Croatia. Serious fighting in Croatia began in July as the Yugoslav army was withdrawing its soldiers and heavy equipment from Slovenia to Croatia and Bosnia. From its many bases throughout continental Croatia and on the Adriatic coast, the Yugoslav army guided, supplied, and backed Serb paramilitary units in a number of regions in southern, central, and eastern Croatia, occupying the territory staked out by them until nearly one-third of Croatia was under Serbian control.

<sup>3</sup>I disagree with those who argue that the brief war in Slovenia in June 1991 was no more than a token gesture by a leadership in Belgrade that had already decided to write off Slovenia. Slovenia was only temporarily left on one side in the confident expectation that, once the rest of Yugoslavia has been put together again, Slovenia—by then totally isolated and discouraged—would rejoin on its own accord.

The war in Croatia was not, as is frequently claimed, a spontaneous uprising by Croatian Serbs fearful for their future because of Tudjman's rhetoric—though some were indeed apprehensive and confused. The war was prepared and coordinated in advance by Belgrade right from the first challenge to the Croat government in August 1990—the so-called *revolucija balvana* ("tree-trunk revolution")—when Serbs placed obstructions on all roads leading to Knin, an old strategic Chetnik stronghold. The first casualty, ironically, was an ethnic Serb wearing a Croatian police uniform.

No amount of political concessions to Croatia's Serb minority by the Tudjman government could have stopped the war. A Croatian surrender in the form of accepting a clearly Belgrade-controlled new Yugoslavia would have done it, but Croatian citizens, although outgunned at every point, would probably have refused to follow. Belgrade was not prepared to let Croatia go and felt it had the strength to try and hold on to it. Croatia's Serbs, for their part, were divided, with the radical minority in control of strongholds such as Knin rejecting any Croatia at all and believing themselves strong enough (with Milosevic's and the army's backing) to confront Zagreb.

That confrontation is still in progress, with the UN forces stationed since April 1992 in a third of Croatia that is occupied by the Serbs stuck in the middle. Croatia is militarily too weak—at least for the time being—to attempt to take these areas back, but cannot for political as well as economic reasons tolerate the present situation forever. The Tudjman government may, therefore, accept a compromise offered by a militarily victorious but economically weakened Milosevic regime. There is, therefore, some hope of resolving this problem without another war.

## A TROUBLING CONNECTION WITH BOSNIA

The real complication for Croatia comes from the government's policy toward the war in Bosnia. There Tudjman has thoroughly compromised Croatia in the eyes of the outside world by allowing the annexationist "Herzegovina lobby," represented in the Zagreb government by the defense minister, Gojko Susak (a successful returnee from exile in Canada), to dictate its Bosnia policy. In the summer of 1992 the government accepted the formation of a separate Croat territorial unit in the compact Croat region of western Herzegovina. But by doing so the Tudjman regime has weakened

Croatia's own case for the return of its occupied territories, which rests on the principle that frontiers must not be changed by force.

There is widespread criticism in Croatia—and not just in opposition circles but also within the ruling CDU—of President Tudjman's close connection with and backing of the shady, deeply unattractive regime of Mate Boban, leader of the self-styled Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, and of Croatia's secret negotiations with Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade and Radovan Karadzic, his ally in Bosnia. The fact that Croatia, still a victim of Serbian aggression, is now widely perceived as Serbia's co-aggressor in Bosnia against the Bosnian Muslims is being blamed on Tudjman personally.

There has since the beginning of 1993 been a steady increase in support for the opposition—particularly the second-largest party in the Croatian parliament, the Croatian Social-Liberal party, headed by Drazen Budisa, a popular student leader during the "Croatian Spring" who spent a number of years in prison afterward. Budisa's stature is growing and he is increasingly perceived as a possible alternative to Tudjman—perhaps at the head of a wider coalition including the liberal wing of the CDU, which is expected to split. There is a strong popular backlash against Tudjman's authoritarianism, the muzzling of the media, and the rampant corruption in the ranks of the ruling party (demonstrated particularly in managing the economy's privatization). Many Croats blame their country's international unpopularity and isolation on the regime's policies, which are pushed through in the parliament thanks to the CDU's large majority that is used ruthlessly. The disastrous economic situation, notably an inflation rate of 30 percent a month, could act as a catalyst for change—perhaps even a change of regime. There is some talk of a possible military coup—dissatisfaction is rife in the Croatian army also—but there is a lack of charismatic military figures with political know-how.

Change is in the air but continued military conflict in the region could delay it. Croatia needs a thorough shakedown if it is to become a functioning, viable, democratic state. Like the other states in the region, what it needs above all is a secure cease-fire followed by a political and diplomatic settlement that holds. It is not sure at all that it will get it. ■

The West, and the United States especially, are obsessed with Slobodan Milosevic, writes Obrad Kesic, but the Serbian president "is on the ropes." Will other leaders and groups in Serbia prove to be key in settling the region's wars and ethnic conflicts, or will the adaptable Milosevic pull off a victory in Bosnia and go down as "one of the Balkan's greatest leaders, who dared to take on the entire world, and won?"

## Serbia: The Politics of Despair

BY OBRAD KESIC

**B**eset by hyperinflation rising at a rate of more than 3 percent an hour, isolated by the most stringent international sanctions ever imposed, immersed in corruption, organized crime, and political apathy, Serbia remains the key to peace in the Balkans. Political developments in Serbia will set the pace for resolving the two-year-old crisis in what was once Yugoslavia and a return to peace and stability in the region—if this is possible.

So far the world community has done a poor job of taking Serbia's pulse. Opportunities for establishing the conditions for peace have been missed because Serbian politics have been misread. The West, and the United States government in particular, have seemingly based their view of what is going on in Serbia on the words and actions of one man, President Slobodan Milosevic.

This focus on Milosevic has become an obsession. It has led to an exaggerated idea of the Serbian president's powers, influence, and skills, and to underestimation of the complexities of Serbian politics, the importance of other figures, and the opportunities that have arisen for Milosevic's removal from the scene.

### UNTRROUBLED BY IDEOLOGY

Arguably Milosevic's rise is one of the two most important events in Yugoslav politics of the past 40 years, the other being the death of President for Life Josip Broz Tito in 1980.<sup>1</sup> Tito's death created a power vacuum in which Yugoslavia descended into political

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<sup>1</sup>For an interesting study of Milosevic, see Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993).

and economic chaos. Tito was replaced by a rotating collective presidency made up of representatives of Yugoslavia's six federal republics and two autonomous provinces. Designed to avoid political battles over succession, this system produced a group of powerless apparatchiks who replaced each other as the symbolic president of the presidency of an increasingly symbolic federation.

The declining influence of the ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia also began to show as deep fissures developed between regional leagues. The governments of the eight federal units began to pursue their individual interests (including foreign affairs) at the expense of the federation's common interests and policies. Without a strong central arbitrator like Tito, the federal government's authority quickly eroded and the center of power shifted to the republics. Holding office in political organizations became more significant than a federal position.

At the time of Tito's death, Slobodan Milosevic was a rising star in the League of Communists of Serbia. Educated at Belgrade University's Faculty of Law, he gained early experience in business as the director of a factory, and later of an international Yugoslav bank with offices in New York, where he spent some time. A well-rounded party apparatchik, he appeared to be a firm believer in Yugoslavia's Tito-style communism.

While at the university, Milosevic displayed his political instinct by making friends with Ivan Stambolic, another man destined for political stardom, who became his mentor and protector. Stambolic would present his protégé with his first important political post in 1984, when as president of the League of Communists of Serbia he appointed Milosevic head of the Belgrade party committee. In this job Milosevic built his reputation as an uncompromising Communist, demonstrating his loyalty to the Titoist system by attacking "anti-Communist" and "nationalist" manifestations at every available opportunity. By 1986 Milosevic, having proved his fealty to the party and his vigilance in defending its monopoly on power against

any challenges, was rewarded with the presidency of the League of Communists of Serbia.

Though throughout his climb to power Milosevic seldom wavered from the rhetoric of class struggle and the Titoist slogan "Brotherhood and Unity," even the targets of his attacks rarely considered him to be an ideologue. Neither ideologist nor idealist, Milosevic was and remains a politician whose only motivations are self-preservation and a desire to enhance his personal power. His strengths are his good political instincts and a full understanding of the Serbian peasant. He is unafraid to take risks when opportunities present themselves, and he creates most of his own opportunities with his ability to identify political swings early and use ideology without succumbing to it. At the beginning of his career in politics he understood the need to portray himself as a firm believer in Titoist Yugoslavia, but he was also among the first to grasp that Tito was dead and the political landscape was dramatically changing.

Milosevic moved to fill the void left by Tito's death by playing to a Yugoslavia-wide constituency, but his instinct soon told him this was an impossible task. So he abandoned that strategy in favor of one that promised instantaneous mass support among a mobilized populace: he decided to manipulate the reawakening of Serbian nationalism centered around the issue of Kosovo.

### THE USES AND ABUSES OF NATIONALISM

Kosovo was the site of the Serbian empire's greatest defeat at the hands of the Turks in 1389, the place that marked the end of an empire that once stretched from the Adriatic to the Aegean Seas. One of Serbia's two autonomous provinces, Kosovo has a population that is about 90 percent Albanian (a non-Slav, Muslim people). The high birth rate among Albanians, rising immigration, and large number of Serbian emigrants leaving Kosovo combined to create a turning point in Serbian politics.

The Kosovo Serbs, feeling isolated and besieged by their Albanian neighbors, claimed that "genocide" was being perpetrated against them and organized mass protests in Kosovo and Belgrade. It was these protests that inspired Milosevic's "meetings of truth," which became the main weapon he used to topple his opponents in Serbia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina. (He tried the same tactic in Montenegro but was not immediately successful.) Milosevic legitimized the latent sense among Serbs that they were discriminated against in the Yugoslav federation, and manipulated Serbs' fears and feelings of persecution to advance his own ambitions.

Milosevic's quick adaptation to a populist nationalist strategy in order to force concessions from the other Yugoslav federal units further weakened the federation and inspired a cult of personality. His picture began to

appear side by side with Tito's at mass rallies, but soon his was the only one displayed.

Milosevic's strategy was simple but his ambitions were grand: he used nationalism to mobilize Serbs in a crusade for a new Yugoslavia. Serbia was to be the stage from which a wave of mass protest would sweep him into the Yugoslav presidency, while Serbia's recentralization through constitutional reforms in 1989 and 1990 would serve as the model for a newly tightened Yugoslav federation in which he, Milosevic, would be Tito. But in the end Milosevic's strategy failed, because whereas he understood the Serb peasant very well, his knowledge of Yugoslavia's other peoples was poor. Furthermore, the genie of Serbian nationalism, once let out of the bottle, proved to be beyond his or anyone else's control. This nationalism tainted all aspects of Serbian society and even became a primary issue for Serbia's weak opposition parties.

### THE SHADOW OPPOSITION AND THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS

While Milosevic was manipulating Serbian and Yugoslav politics, very few voices were raised initially against him. Many of the prominent figures who would later become opposition leaders, such as Vuk Draskovic, head of the Serbian Renewal Movement, openly praised Milosevic for standing up for Serbian rights. Draskovic, Vojislav Seselj (leader of the Serbian Radical party), and others passionately decried the Communist system but noticeably avoided direct attacks on Milosevic.

While Milosevic encouraged the open expression of Serbian nationalism, most opposition leaders took it to new lengths. Draskovic and Seselj were among the first to speak of the creation of a "Greater Serbia," and even distributed maps with revised borders. When war broke out elsewhere in Yugoslavia, in the republic of Croatia and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both men organized volunteer paramilitary units that joined local Serbs in the early phases of both conflicts.

The first multiparty elections held in Serbia, in December 1990, found the opposition parties more in opposition to each other than to Milosevic and his Socialist Party of Serbia (the renamed League of Communists of Serbia). Milosevic, always the master manipulator, played off the opposition's squabbling. The state media, controlled by Milosevic, magnified differences among the opposition and portrayed the parties as frustrated and incompetent bickerers unfit to wield political power. Milosevic won a landslide victory.

The factions of the opposition found themselves caught between their commitment to democratic principles and their patriotic advocacy of Serbian national interests. Their dilemma was compounded in May 1992 when the UN Security Council approved sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. These sanctions were designed to

isolate the Milosevic regime for its involvement in the war in Bosnia and for its support of the Bosnian Serbs.

The sanctions have effectively demolished Serbia's economy and have isolated the Serbs, but have not improved the situation in Bosnia, nor have they weakened Milosevic's hold on power. Their objectives have always been murky—are they designed to influence Serb behavior or are they purely punitive? The reasons behind the sanctions were never spelled out to the Serbs, nor was it clear what actions needed to be undertaken for their removal. As a result they are perceived by most Serbs to be unjustified, unfair, and degrading, and they have served to rally Serb defiance. Under these circumstances Serbs have indirectly and directly supported the Milosevic government by refusing to mobilize against it and by directing most of their hostility toward the international community. Most Serbs do not have the energy to rise up, since the day-to-day struggle for survival preoccupies them. Furthermore, the sanctions have hindered the Serbian opposition's ability to draw attention to the regime's greatest weakness—its incompetent economic policies, which have accelerated the fall in the standard of living. The isolation has also reduced the opposition leaders' ability to portray themselves as having the same stature as Milosevic; whereas the latter is constantly being courted by peace negotiators and international leaders, the opposition is largely ignored, effectively relegated to the shadows of Serbian politics.

It is widely accepted that communism's end was hastened because even totalitarian regimes could not completely isolate their people from Western democratic ideas disseminated through modern communications, scholarly exchanges, and the media. Ironically, the international community through its sanctions has succeeded where the Communists failed; it has isolated average Serbs and even the democratic opposition, thus ensuring Milosevic's hold on power. Opposition leaders find themselves fighting against the regime with both hands tied behind their backs.

### THE MISSED CHANCES

Despite all this, two major opportunities for toppling Milosevic have presented themselves. Unfortunately both were squandered.

The first came on March 9, 1991, when more than 150,000 Serbs took to the streets of Belgrade at the urging of Vuk Draskovic. As demonstrators clashed with police and their ranks swelled with people flocking to Belgrade from outlying areas, the possibility of a Romanian-style revolution loomed large. But this possibility was never realized, for three main reasons: Milosevic's temporary accommodation with his opponents, the Yugoslav government's failure to take action in support of the demonstrators, and Draskovic's premature and abrupt decision to end the confrontation.

Of these three the first and last were the most decisive. Milosevic showed his political instinct by making only minimal concessions (most of which he later reneged on) at one of the last moments when he still appeared to be in control of the situation; making them earlier might have led to greater demands, and if he had waited longer they might have been too little, too late. Draskovic's backing down at the peak of his triumph revealed his political inexperience and his lack of understanding of the tool that had made Milosevic—the power of the masses. Caught unprepared by the success of the demonstrations, Draskovic failed to exploit one of Milosevic's weakest moments.

The second opportunity to unseat Milosevic presented itself in the unlikely form of Yugoslav-born American businessman Milan Panic. As prime minister of the federal government of the rump Yugoslavia, Panic challenged Milosevic in the election for Serbian president last December. With the backing of Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic and most of the opposition parties, Panic took on Milosevic head on. Panic's American-style politicking—mixing stump speeches with local rallies—appealed to many Serbs who were tired of the war and saw Panic as a bridge to the West. This chance was lost principally because the international community waited too long to support Panic.

The appointment of Panic as federal prime minister had been greeted with widespread skepticism, perceived to be an attempt by Milosevic to present a more acceptable face to the outside world. Although Panic was received by many global leaders, few took him seriously. When the Yugoslav prime minister began openly to criticize Milosevic, many outside observers saw it as an orchestrated hoax. Even when Panic made substantial concessions—such as returning the Prevlaka coastal territory to Croatia, calling for international monitors at all Yugoslav civil and military airports to report if Yugoslav warplanes were involved in combat operations in Bosnia, and requesting monitors on Yugoslavia's borders with Bosnia—they were not acknowledged because Panic still was not taken seriously. Yugoslavia's isolation continued to be strictly enforced, thus opening Panic to charges by Serbs that he was a foreign agent engaged in selling out Serbia.

In winning more than 56 percent of the vote in a tampered election, Milosevic once again proved his political mastery. He had used Panic and Cosic to make concessions necessary to stave off possible military attack from abroad without appearing as though he had given in to international pressure. When the world community failed to reward Panic's concessions, Milosevic was able to gain major political mileage from the prime minister's apparent failures. Milosevic was also able to incite Vojislav Seselj and his nationalist followers to brand Panic a traitor to the Serbian cause. Seselj ensured Milosevic's victory by agreeing not to make the presidential election a

three-way race—which would have split the nationalist vote between Seselj and Milosevic. In return Seselj demanded the dismissal of Cosic, Panic, and the prime minister's namesake, Zivota Panic, commander of the Yugoslav army. He would eventually get everything he asked for.

## SESELJ AND THE RADICALIZATION OF THE SERBIAN PEOPLE

The 1992 elections established Seselj as a major force in Serbian politics. His Serbian Radical party gained control of more than one-third of the seats in both the Yugoslav and Serbian parliaments. He openly gloated over Panic's defeat and his own role as kingmaker. Although most observers wrote Seselj off as Milosevic's pawn, there were growing signs that Seselj was charting his own path.

Seselj was one of the first opposition leaders to be manipulated by Milosevic and eventually co-opted into his grand strategy. Milosevic used Seselj as a foil, the bad cop to his good cop; whenever he was challenged on his demands, Milosevic could point to Seselj and ask, "Would you rather deal with him?" Seselj played along because by doing so he was assured of greater influence and more media exposure than any Serbian politician other than Milosevic. More important, he was willing to cooperate so long as Milosevic's objectives coincided with his own. But always, unlike Milosevic, Seselj had an ideology in which he believed—Serbian nationalism.

Seselj's base of support is now larger and more consistent than any other Serbian politician's. His appeal lies mainly in his uncompromising nationalism and his quick wit. Many uneducated Serbs, especially in rural areas, see Seselj as the only politician who has remained true to himself and his support for Serbian national interests. Seselj's claims that an international conspiracy led by the Vatican, Germany, and the United States is determined to destroy Serbia have become credible to a large number of Serbs who cannot understand why they alone have been singled out as the villains in the chaos in what was Yugoslavia. The international community's attempts to isolate Milosevic's regime have brought about the radicalization of the Serbian people.

Now that Milosevic, in a bid to get the sanctions lifted, has decided to cast off his nationalist image for a more conciliatory one, Seselj will not let him. When Milosevic put pressure on Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, to sign the peace plan put forward last winter by Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, the negotiators for the UN and the EC respectively, Seselj undermined his efforts by going to the front lines in Bosnia and appealing directly to the Bosnian Serbs, promising them he would not allow anyone to sell them out. Seselj portrayed the Vance-Owen plan as a shameful deal for Serbs and a betrayal of Serb national

interests. He staged mass rallies in Serbia that served as a warning to Milosevic that the bad cop had learned the lessons of populist politics.

Seselj anticipated Milosevic's attempts to check his influence and acted to head them off. When Milosevic purged the Yugoslav military of generals openly loyal to Seselj, Seselj delivered a masterful counterstroke by withholding his party's support for the defense budget and charging General Zivota Panic with corruption. Milosevic was forced to compromise with Seselj and Panic was replaced by General Momcilo Perisic, a veteran of fighting in Croatia and Bosnia. This August, more than 100 other generals were retired, leaving an uneasy balance in the Yugoslav army between Milosevic and Seselj supporters. Seselj had battled Milosevic to a draw.

Milosevic was not so lucky when it came to persuading Karadzic to accept the Vance-Owen plan. Despite dramatic personal appeals for acceptance by Milosevic, Cosic, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, and Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, the Bosnian Serb parliament, bolstered by Seselj's support and the determination of hard-liners, overwhelmingly rejected the plan. It was Milosevic's first serious political defeat, and the image of invulnerability was shattered. Seselj looked on the rejection as a personal victory. His challenge to Milosevic gained momentum, and a showdown between the two became inevitable.

The Bosnian Serb rejection, and the attempts of Serbs in the Krajina region of Croatia to create a new state with their Bosnian brethren, also underline the danger of viewing Serbian politics or interests as monolithic. Each group of Serbs may share the dream of uniting in a Greater Serbia, but their individual interests will determine how committed each is to this dream, and what price each is prepared to pay to attain it.

## THE NEXT ROUND

For the foreseeable future Serbia will turn inward as political conflicts come to a head. Weakened by international sanctions and the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, Serbia is ill equipped to spread conflict to Macedonia and Kosovo, as some have suggested it might. Milosevic will avoid conflict in Kosovo and renewed fighting in Croatia at all costs. He needs time to regroup, to consolidate his power, and to improve Serbia's economy. If confronted with unrest in Kosovo or a Croatian offensive in Krajina, he will react forcefully because he cannot allow his current domestic political troubles to be exacerbated by the appearance of weakness on issues of national security.

Milosevic's defeat in Bosnia and his failure to get the sanctions lifted have left him vulnerable. Cosic's removal as president of Yugoslavia at the initiative of Seselj's Radicals, and Draskovic's arrest and beating in June by Serbian police, highlighted Milosevic's political insecurity. For the first time since March 1991,

Milosevic had to resort to force in order to reestablish his authority.

Although he is on the ropes, Milosevic is far from down. The UN-EC peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina that was proposed in August has given him new life. If accepted, the plan would lead to the creation of a Bosnian Serb republic that could eventually be co-opted into Yugoslavia, and it might lead to the alleviation of the sanctions. Milosevic can then portray himself as the victor. His legend would be assured—one of the Balkan's greatest leaders, who dared to take on the entire world, and won. It is possible that once a peace settlement is reached the bankruptcy of Milosevic's economic and political platforms will be exposed and he will be toppled; however, given the historical appeal of strongmen and bravado to the Serbian electorate, this would seem unlikely.

To ensure his grip on power, Milosevic must get rid of Seselj. This will not be easy. Not only has Seselj gained support in Serbia, he has his own well-armed militia and the backing of most Serbs outside the country, including the battle-hardened Serb armies that regard Milosevic with deep suspicion. Seselj has taken the offensive, announcing on September 2 that his party was forming a shadow government in preparation for taking over in "a democratic and parliamentary way." He announced that the success of the government's austerity program would decide its fate and that if the economic situation does not improve it could fall in February 1994.

The Serbs outside Serbia, the so-called "Western Serbs," will play an influential role in Serbia's politics, as they did in Tito's Yugoslavia. As in World War II, when they made up the core of Tito's victorious forces,

these Western Serbs once again find themselves militarily successful, and they are poised to set Serbia's political agenda. Individual Serb leaders from Bosnia and Krajina may become important in the political hierarchy in Belgrade. There is little doubt that the politics of the periphery will continue to affect Serbia's political future.

As the battle lines between Milosevic and Seselj are drawn, the democratic opposition can only stand by and await the outcome. Groups like Dragoljub Micunovic's Democratic party and Vojislav Kostunica's Serbian Democratic party, which have liberal democratic platforms and solid economic programs, lack the political capital to be a serious factor. Draskovic's Serbian Renewal party is beset by divisions and Draskovic himself seems to have lost his initiative. Having realized like Seselj that the Western Serbs may hold the key to toppling Milosevic, they and other opposition parties are maneuvering for their support. The democratic opposition's only hope of influencing Serbia's immediate political future rests in its ability to overcome petty bickering and form a united democratic front.

The international community should pay close attention to the upcoming political developments in Serbia. Relying on the lessons of past opportunities missed, it should not be a casual observer but should do everything in its power to exploit the Milosevic-Seselj conflict and assist the democratic opposition in forming a viable movement. A missed chance at this stage may lead to further instability in the region and to the fulfillment of the international community's prophecy of either a re-ignited Serbian-Croatian war or an explosion in Kosovo. ■

"Albanians have survived an extremely difficult first year after communism, and seem to have settled down to a painful but astonishingly smooth transformation into a pluralistic democracy and a market economy." But, hemmed in by threatening neighbors and ethnically involved in regional conflicts, will Albania remain unaffected by the passions sweeping the Balkans?

## Albania's Road to Democracy

BY ELEZ BIBERAJ

**A**lbania was the last Eastern European state to free itself from Communist rule, and its prospects for democratization seemed incomparably less promising than those of the others. Enver Hoxha's regime, among the most repressive in the world, had effectively prevented the emergence of democratic leaders and thinkers. The Democratic party, which came to power in a stunning victory in elections held March 22, 1992, inherited a polity on the verge of disintegration. The economy had all but collapsed, and Albania had become totally dependent on humanitarian aid from abroad to feed its people. Most observers were predicting the country would either descend into anarchy or slide back into dictatorship.

While many hurdles remain, Sali Berisha, whom parliament elected Albania's first post-Communist president in April 1992, has initiated major reforms aimed at establishing a genuine pluralistic democracy and a free market economy. A man of keen intellect and formidable political skills, Berisha has handled his job with insight and confidence.

Having received a clear popular mandate for radical change (it captured 92 seats in the 140-seat parliament), Berisha's Democratic party has proceeded with remarkable speed to dismantle the Communist system and lay the groundwork for a society based on the rule of law. The Law on Constitutional Provisions, which superseded the country's Communist-era constitution, endorses the principle of separation of powers, guarantees human rights, and protects private property. A special commission, assisted by experts from abroad, is drafting a new constitution.

In the midst of an intense debate between proponents of executive power and those who favor a larger

role for the legislative branch, Berisha came out on the side of a parliamentary system and championed the development of political institutions that would maintain sufficient checks on the chief executive. Democracy in Albania, he has insisted, depends on the establishment of a parliamentary tradition. But even some of Berisha's persistent critics have said that the nation needs a strong presidency during the transition—and indeed, the Law on Constitutional Provisions gives the president broad powers.

The media in Albania are making progress toward becoming a potent force. While radio and television are government controlled, more than 200 newspapers are published throughout the country (most of these, however, have so far been dominated by former Communist propagandists). A free and objective press has yet to be firmly established.

### STICK WITH REFORM, AND HOPE FOREIGN INVESTMENT FOLLOWS

Albania has been quicker than perhaps any other former Communist country in implementing radical economic reforms. Under the Berisha government spending has been slashed, the Albanian currency (the lek) has been made fully convertible, and barriers to foreign trade have been eliminated. The government swiftly tackled perhaps the most explosive economic and social problem facing the country: it ended most subsidies and liberalized prices, with the exception of those on staple consumer goods such as bread and milk, for which ceilings were set.

An important element of the government's economic plan has been the development of the new private sector. Some 90 percent of the land has been distributed to private farmers. About half the state farms have been privatized, and the government hopes to put the rest in the hands of private owners by year's end. Agriculture has responded favorably to price reform and privatization: production this year is expected to grow between 10 percent and 15 percent. Privatization has progressed rapidly in retailing and

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services, transportation, and housing. Some 100,000 of Albania's 3.2 million people have found employment in private enterprises.

But in the vital industrial sector the process has been very slow. Given the lack of domestic capital and the resources required for restructuring, privatization of large industrial concerns will probably be impossible without substantial foreign investment. For the foreseeable future the government is likely to continue operating unprofitable large enterprises, fearing that support for reform cannot be sustained if there are massive liquidations and layoffs.

Privatization has also been hindered by uncertainties regarding settlement of the claims of those whose land and property were confiscated without compensation under communism. Both ex-owners and emerging entrepreneurs, most of the latter former members of the nomenklatura who bought shops and small businesses for token payments during the last year of Communist rule, have criticized a new law that provides for compensation but not full restitution.

The government has also moved rapidly to create the legal framework for a market economy. Legislation concerning taxes, legal accounting, bankruptcy, and the banking system has been adopted. Parliament is in the process of amending the law on foreign investment, and officials say the new version will be among the most liberal in the region. Nevertheless, hoped-for major foreign investments have not yet materialized because of Albania's poor—or in some cases, nonexistent—infrastructure, and because of instability in the region.

By this summer the government claimed that the precipitous fall in production that began in 1990 had been arrested, the currency had been stabilized, and inflation had dropped to zero. But despite these encouraging signs the economy still faces serious problems. Enormous institutional obstacles remain in the conversion of a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Foreign debt has climbed to \$625 million. Some 450,000 Albanians are unemployed, of whom 350,000 receive government assistance.

The crisis has been mitigated by substantial humanitarian and economic assistance from Italy, the EC, the United States, and Turkey. Albanian refugees in Greece, Italy, and other Western countries have also played an important role: remittances from abroad are estimated at \$400 million annually.

The prospects for a quick economic recovery are good. Albania is relatively rich in minerals and petroleum, and with assistance from other countries it will be in a position to efficiently tap its natural resources. But the keys are foreign investment, the government's perseverance with the reform, and continued political stability.

## DEMOCRACY: MORE EXPERIENCE NECESSARY

As the concept of a market economy is a new one for Albania, so is that of democracy. Although the country briefly experimented with multiparty politics in the 1920s, it did not develop a genuine pluralistic democracy, and then communism descended; the majority of Albanians have had no direct experience with a democratic system. In the present formative stage of political pluralism, Albania has seen a volatile party system come into being. While political participation is concentrated almost exclusively within the realm of the parties, citizens' identification with parties remains relatively weak as these groups seek to develop their positions on the issues amid shifting political allegiances. Despite the rise of numerous parties covering the spectrum from extreme left to extreme right, there are striking similarities among the programs of the country's most important parties. It will take some time for Albanian parties to become viable political entities.

*The ruling center-right Democratic party* has from the beginning been the country's most important, with a wide base of support that cuts across all segments of society. Founded as the first non-Communist political force in Albania in December 1990, the party attracted individuals with diverse interests, which led to acrimonious infighting over the pace and extent of the dismantling of the Communist system. Initially, a leftist faction led by economist Gramoz Pashko controlled top positions and influenced the tone of debate within the party. This faction was gradually shunned after the Democrats joined with the Communists in a coalition government in June 1991, Pashko becoming deputy prime minister. Strong anti-Communists advocating the rapid eradication of communism gained influence. Berisha maintained a centrist position, juggling and usually managing to balance contending forces within the party.

But after its triumph in the 1992 election the Democratic party was unable to preserve its unity, and within months the leadership split. This split derived less from differences over policy than from personality clashes and competition for power. Opinion within the party having shifted significantly to the right, Berisha and his mainstream faction saw no reason to placate the left wing. Pashko and his supporters had been kept out of the new government, and Berisha further upset his rivals by endorsing as his successor for party leader the 32-year-old intellectual, party secretary Eduard Selami. Naturally some in the leadership, particularly deputy chairmen Azem Hajdari and Arben Imami, believed themselves to be more qualified than Selami. The leftists precipitated an open division by publicly proclaiming that rightist forces had usurped power within the party. Berisha and his men responded by expelling from the party Pashko, Imami, and several other founding members, but—significantly—not

Hajdari, who at the last minute switched sides. The disgruntled politicians formed their own party, the Democratic Alliance.

Although rightists seemed to have gained the upper hand, Selami has been careful to keep the extremists at bay, pursuing policies that attempt to reconcile conflicting interests among the party's constituency. This August right-wingers suffered a severe blow with the dismissal of Agriculture Minister Petrit Kalakula, who had called for an aggressive approach in wiping out the Communist legacy. Kalakula's departure was a clear indication the party will stay its moderate course.

Other forces will no doubt strive to become the beneficiaries of popular discontent caused by economic hardship. So far, however, no one else has come up with a credible alternate plan, and the Democratic party is likely to remain the country's main political force. If party unity begins to disintegrate, however, this will open the door for others, perhaps undermining Berisha's ability to keep to the path of radical economic reform.

The Socialist party, the second largest in parliament, with 38 seats, adopted its current name and western European social-democratic labels at the tenth congress of the Albanian Party of Labor in June 1991. Its membership consists mainly of the most militant elements of Hoxha's old party, but its leaders maintain it is a new grouping, not burdened by the Party of Labor's past. The party has refused to express remorse or apologize for Communist crimes, and its criticism of Hoxha has been halfhearted. Focusing on giving voice to the egalitarian and anti-capitalist sentiment of workers who have suddenly found themselves in a free market society, the Socialists have taken every opportunity to undermine the government.

The party was shaken in July by the arrest of its leader, Fatos Nano, who was accused of having misappropriated \$8 million during his short stint as prime minister in 1991. Going beyond their usual practice of attacking Berisha and his party with harsh invective, leading Socialists called for the use of "all democratic means" to get the present government out of office. In an attempt to provoke mass protests the Socialists organized rallies throughout the country, but this strategy backfired when large numbers of demonstrators failed to turn out.

The authorities, increasingly confident of their strength and of popular support for the anti-corruption drive, moved against corrupt former Communists even at the cost of heightening tension between parties. Former President Ramiz Alia (who had already been under house arrest for almost a year), and several former Politburo members and senior government officials were arrested on charges of corruption and abuse of power.

Berisha has denied Socialist charges that the anti-corruption drive was politically motivated, saying cor-

ruption is an evil that must be rooted out if Albania's fledgling democracy is to have credibility. But despite the highly publicized crackdown, there have been allegations of corruption within the Democratic government, including ones touching members of the cabinet. Minister of Economy and Finances Genc Ruli has faced persistent charges of corruption going back to 1991, when he served in the coalition government; he has consistently denied the accusations.

While the Socialist party will probably continue to represent a formidable challenge to the Democrats, it will gradually be marginalized unless it makes a clean break with its Communist past and selects a new, uncompromised leadership.

The Social Democratic party, led by former senior Albanian Party of Labor members, is the third-largest bloc in parliament, holding seven seats. Although ostensibly allied with the Democratic party, it has been highly critical of the government. In June the Social Democrats joined the Socialists in boycotting parliamentary sessions because of the delay in adopting a new constitution, but after Nano's arrest they sought to revive their coalition with the Democratic party. With the Social Democrats apparently concerned by the public's negative reaction to their seeming alliance with the Socialists, both the dissenting parties returned to parliament in September.

The Republican party has operated largely in the shadow of the Democratic party. In the 1992 elections it received less than 4 percent of the national vote, winning only one seat in parliament. The party's poor performance is attributed to the lack of a clear program and leadership problems.

On the right, several parties have emerged, but they have been unable to build viable nationwide organizations and attract a substantial following.

## THE END OF ISOLATION

Berisha has been heavily engaged in formulating and implementing foreign policy, and has put Albania back on the international map after years of isolation. His main objectives have been to assure continued economic assistance for the reform program, to persuade the world community to take action to prevent war in the former Yugoslavia from spreading to Kosovo province in Serbia, and full integration with the rest of Europe. Cognizant of Albania's domination in the past by its allies (Italy in the 1930s, Yugoslavia in the 1940s, and the Soviet Union in the 1950s), Berisha has pursued an open door policy, attempting to lead his country away from dependence on a single foreign patron by diversifying Tirane's ties.

Since mid-1991 Albania has received an estimated \$1 billion in humanitarian and economic assistance, most of it from the EC. Italy has been in the forefront here, and Albania is increasingly orienting itself toward its western neighbor. Berisha has forged especially

close relations with the United States. In addition to financial and technical assistance, the Albanians are evidently looking to Washington for support in modernizing their armed forces.

Last December Albania became the first former Warsaw Pact country to request membership in NATO. Fearing a possible conflict with Serbia, Albania is desperately seeking a security arrangement with the alliance. While the request for membership has been rejected, Albania's cooperation with NATO has steadily increased.

Foreign policy remains among the most divisive issues in Albania today. While there is general agreement on the opening to the world, foreign policy options are heatedly debated. Leftist forces, particularly the Socialist party and the Democratic Alliance, have charged that Berisha's foreign policy is slavishly pro-American; the Socialists, ever more virulently anti-American in posture, have launched a campaign against United States diplomats in Tirane, particularly the highly popular ambassador, William Ryerson. Berisha is accused of emphasizing Tirane's relationship with Washington at the expense of closer ties with Europe.

No event has more starkly illustrated differences over foreign policy than the controversy late last year over Albania's membership in the Islamic Conference. Critics expressed concern that Tirane's close identification with the Islamic world would lead Western Europe to reassess its policy toward Albania, whose population is predominantly Muslim. Berisha took pains to counter domestic criticism by stressing the advantages of potential assistance from the Islamic nations, and expressed confidence that Albania's membership in the conference would not adversely affect its ties with the West. But despite increasing links with the Muslim world, there is no truth to reports of Islamic fundamentalism in Albania.

### DISGRUNTLED NEIGHBORS

Whereas Berisha's foreign policy has in general been successful, his efforts to begin a new chapter in relations with Albania's neighbors just across its borders have had mixed results.

After a year of promising cooperation, Albanian-Greek relations took a turn for the worse in July, when Albania expelled a Greek Orthodox priest whom it said had fanned separatist feeling among Albania's small ethnic Greek community. Athens retaliated by deporting some 30,000 illegal Albanian economic refugees and canceling several scheduled ministerial meetings. Moreover, Greece raised the specter of territorial claims on southern Albania by insisting that Albania should be willing to grant ethnic Greeks (who are concentrated in the south) the same rights it demands for the 2 million ethnic Albanians in the rump Yugoslavia. (Albania has supported demands for Kosovo's separa-

tion from Serbia put forward by the ethnic Albanians who make up 90 percent of the province's population.)

By its vitriolic reaction Greece apparently hoped to weaken Berisha's position and extract concessions on a special status for the Greek minority in Albania. But Greece's newly threatening stance had the opposite effect, resulting in an upsurge of support for Berisha and calls to halt the "Hellenization" of southern Albania. There was anger among Albanians over the deportations and, more generally, over the parallel Athens had drawn between ethnic Greeks and the Kosovars. Wary of its southern neighbor's long-term intentions, Tirane expressed concern that Greece, despite its assertion of neutrality in the Yugoslav war, had tilted toward Serbia; the Albanian media has alleged a "secret deal" between Greece and Serbia on southern Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia. The Albanians also appear extremely apprehensive about Greece's assumption of the EC presidency in January 1994. For its part, Greece has vehemently rejected the notion of Kosovo's separation from Serbia, claiming this would radically upset the status quo in the Balkans. It has also called Albania's increasingly close ties with Turkey worrisome.

It remains to be seen whether the recent crisis was a passing storm in Albanian-Greek relations or whether the relationship is in danger of succumbing to the powerful nationalist impulses sweeping the Balkans. Suspicions linger on both sides, and will probably prevent rapprochement in the near future.

To the east, Albania has strongly supported the independence of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, and was among the first countries to recognize the Skopje government. Economic cooperation between the two nations has grown steadily and the prospects for further cooperation are good. But relations continue to be marred by disagreement regarding the status of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, who represent between 30 percent and 40 percent of the population. The Albanians have demanded equality with Slav Macedonians, and while Skopje has promised to take steps to improve their political and social status, Macedonian extremists fear an "Albanianization" of their country. Although Tirane has discouraged separatist tendencies among the ethnic Albanians, maintaining that an independent Macedonia is vital to Albania's national interest, there are increasing calls for the establishment of an autonomous ethnic Albanian entity in western Macedonia, and even for outright union with Albania. Unless Slav Macedonians and Albanians find an arrangement acceptable to both, Macedonia could very well face ethnic strife that could threaten its existence as an independent state.

In the most dramatic demonstration of Albania's new approach to foreign policy, Berisha has offered an olive branch to Montenegro, the junior partner in the

rump Yugoslavia. Taking advantage of the different stances of the two new Yugoslav republics on a number of issues, including Kosovo, Berisha has suggested Montenegro be treated differently from Serbia. He has called for international sanctions against Yugoslavia to be lifted for Montenegro. In September Montenegro's president, Miomir Bulatovic, visited Tirane. While the new tack is likely to be unpopular domestically as well as in Kosovo, Berisha apparently hopes to drive a wedge between Serbia and Montenegro at a time when Albania confronts the growing likelihood of a bloody conflict with Serbia over Kosovo.

Serbia, which imposed direct rule on the formerly autonomous province of Kosovo in 1989, has violated the human rights of ethnic Albanians on a massive scale, marginalizing them as a group politically and economically. With the exception of war-torn Bosnia, no ethnic group in Europe has endured more state repression than the Albanians in Serbia. Ethnic Albanians have proclaimed Kosovo's independence and have assumed some aspects of self-rule, setting up parallel institutions. President Ibrahim Rugova—who was elected in a democratic election in Kosovo but is not recognized by Belgrade—advocates the establishment of an independent Kosovo with close ties to both Serbia and Albania. He has offered guarantees for the protection of the rights of the ethnic Serbian minority in Kosovo. Serbia, however, has not only resolutely rejected the idea of independence for Kosovo but has also refused to consider restoring the autonomy the region enjoyed before 1989. Amid more onerous Serbian repression, growing numbers of Albanians are challenging Rugova's leadership, questioning his counsel of peaceful resistance.

With Bosnia divided up between Serb and Croat militias and the Bosnian army, and probably soon to be officially dismembered, many believe that Serbia's strongman, Slobodan Milosevic, will be tempted to extend his horrendous policy of "ethnic cleansing" to Kosovo. Albania has declared that in such an event it will come to the assistance of Kosovo's 2 million ethnic Albanians. Yet the Albanian army is no match for Serbia's, and if war breaks out in Kosovo Albania will face a deluge of refugees that would severely tax its weak economy and fledgling democracy.

For Albanians on both sides of the border, the key issue is preventing war—the majority apparently having deferred for the present their unification in a single state. Berisha has suggested that Kosovo be placed under United Nations control until the final status of the region is determined through negotiations. He has also demanded that the lifting of international sanctions against Serbia be linked to the peaceful solution of the Kosovo question.

Both Berisha and Rugova have pinned their hopes on the international community's taking measures to prevent the war in other parts of what was once

Yugoslavia from spreading to Kosovo. United States President Bill Clinton has reaffirmed his predecessor George Bush's warning to Milosevic that Serbian aggression in Kosovo would prompt an American military response. It is not clear, however, what specific Serbian action would trigger it. The Albanians of Kosovo are subjected almost daily to brutal acts of military and police violence. Moreover, ethnic cleansing is reportedly well underway, with some 300,000 Albanians forced to flee the province to western Europe and the United States since 1989. The Albanians fear that Milosevic, continuing with his current repressive measures and low-intensity conflict, will succeed—without triggering foreign military intervention—in drastically changing the ethnic composition of Kosovo, to the Albanians' detriment. Thousands of Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia are already being settled in Kosovo.

The reward of Serbian aggression in Bosnia has accentuated Albanian anxieties that the international community might remain aloof if war broke out in Kosovo. But conflict in Kosovo is not peripheral to Western interests; strategic concerns are involved. An armed conflict in Kosovo would represent the first truly ethnic war in the former Yugoslavia, pitting Slavs against non-Slav, predominantly Muslim, Albanians. It would very likely dwarf atrocities in Bosnia and precipitate an all-out Balkan war involving Albania, Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Taking strong preventive action now and forcing Serbia into direct negotiations with Albanian representatives on a new relationship between Kosovo and Serbia will save the world from further bloodshed and instability later.

## FOR THE SECOND YEAR...

Albanians have survived an extremely difficult first year after communism and seem to have settled down to a painful but astonishingly smooth transformation into a pluralistic democracy and a market economy. Albania's charismatic president, an optimist by nature, has an extraordinary capacity not to give in to despair and disillusionment. He has demonstrated an ability to build and sustain the coalitions necessary to ensure adequate political support for economic transition and to weather the enormous social dislocations such a transition is bound to cause. Despite the increasing nastiness of political discourse in Albania, Berisha has continued to operate within a democratic framework, and opponents' persistent warnings about his dictatorial tendencies have proved unfounded.

For half a century Albania had simply dropped off the world's radar screen. With political and economic support from the international community, under Berisha's able leadership Albania could successfully make the transition to full-fledged democracy and become a beachhead of stability in the turbulent Balkans. ■

Considering Bulgaria's progress toward democracy and economic reform "in a region rocked by war and ethnic violence and marked by the intransigence of old elites, [it is] strange . . . that the West has not tried to exploit Bulgaria as a political ally—to cultivate it as an island of democratic stability in the Balkans."

## Bulgaria: Stable Ground in the Balkans?

BY LUAN TROXEL

**A**mong the Balkan countries Bulgaria is a bright light in a very dark place. Over the last several years it has demonstrated a consistent commitment to maintaining democracy. Although it has not entirely integrated its sizable minority population (primarily Turkish) into the political realm, it has made strides toward greater participation by and representation of minorities in politics at the national level. It has shown that it is serious about economic change, adopting privatization legislation and implementing austerity measures, and staying the course despite severe economic shocks from without.

These trends stand out in a region rocked by war and ethnic violence and marked by the intransigence of old elites. It is all the more strange, then, that the West has not tried to exploit Bulgaria as a political ally—to cultivate it as an island of democratic stability in the Balkans.

### KEEPING UP DEMOCRACY

Bulgaria's longtime Communist party boss, Todor Zhivkov, was ousted in November 1989, as other Communist leaders throughout Eastern Europe were falling. The difference was that Zhivkov was pushed out by the party, which retained power. The agreement to open up the system to competitive elections came later, in 1990, and the winner of the first free elections held that summer for a Grand National Assembly—a constituent assembly charged with dissolving itself after writing a constitution—was the reformed Communist party, calling itself the Bulgarian Socialist party.

This led some to believe that Bulgaria was not fully democratizing, that the totalitarian system had not really broken down, or that the election had been a fraud. But most international observers asserted that the balloting had been free and fair—as they did for the country's second election, which took place in October 1991. In fact, while many Bulgarians have continued to

back the Socialists, both leaders and ordinary citizens have also consistently supported democracy.

First, elections have been fair. Second, despite the severe disillusionment caused by the economic crisis of 1990–1991, citizens did not give up on the democratic process; although turnout for the 1991 election might have been expected to be far lower than for the previous year's balloting, it was actually above 90 percent. Finally, Bulgarians are still actively reading newspapers, following the proceedings of the National Assembly, signing petitions, writing open letters, and mounting demonstrations. While such activities do not always make for the most stable democracy (Bulgaria has had five prime ministers since Zhivkov), they are important elements of a free democratic society.

Moreover, while national leaders elsewhere in the Balkans have taken advantage of their popularity and ethnic divisions to indulge their authoritarian tendencies, those who govern Bulgaria have maintained democratic practices. This is not to say they are not interested in amassing power—of course they are. But leaders like President Zhelyu Zhelev, who remains among the most popular politicians in Bulgaria, have neither called out the army (which also enjoys substantial popularity) nor stirred up ethnic hostilities as President Slobodan Milosevic has done in Serbia, nor called on a group within society, as President Ion Iliescu has done with the miners in Romania, to bolster their authority and power.

Instead, when Zhelev wanted more control, he attempted to expand the power of the presidency through institutional means—as evidenced in his struggle with the government over which institution should control the national intelligence service. The strength of democracy in Bulgaria can be gauged by what happened next: the media expressed outrage, the government fell, and there were demonstrations against Zhelev, which the authorities made no attempt to hinder. Elsewhere in the Balkans this kind of response to political leaders is seldom seen.

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## MAKING THE TURKS AT HOME

Bulgaria's Turkish minority makes up approximately 10 percent of the population. They are Muslim, mostly agrarian, have citizenship, and have lived in Bulgaria since the Ottoman Empire. Ethnic Bulgarians and Turks lived together with relatively little friction for most of the postwar period. But problems flared up in 1984 when Zhivkov's Communist regime implemented a "Bulgarization" campaign aimed at the Turks, banning the Turkish language and traditional garb, closing mosques, and forcing Turks to take Bulgarian names. The Turks appeared to have been reined in, and the campaign seemed to have fizzled out by 1988, but problems flared up again the following spring and summer with the exodus of many of the remaining Turks and the forced expulsion of others. The combination of a resurgence of Bulgarization and greater freedom of travel resulted in some being thrown out of the country, some intimidated into leaving, and others leaving voluntarily. The timing of the exodus was crucial, since many of the Turks were agricultural workers and they left just when many fruits and other crops had to be planted or were ready for harvesting; the "Turkish problem" thus exacerbated already poor economic conditions by creating shortages of common food products. University students and other Bulgarians from the cities were organized into work brigades and sent on mandatory tours of duty to labor in the countryside.

Not surprisingly, when Zhivkov was overthrown and the transition to a new society began, one of the main problems confronting leaders and ordinary citizens was ethnic tension. A great number of people were full of resentment against the Turks (many of whom had by then returned from Turkey), feeling they had contributed to the past summer's economic crunch. The Turks had taken a little vacation in Turkey, these Bulgarians said, while they had had to report to their jobs on Saturdays and serve in work brigades to make up for it.

There was a wave of demonstrations at which protesters insisted that Turks not be given full civil rights. (Ironically, these demonstrations coincided with the ones calling for a multiparty system and full democracy.) The run-up to the first free elections was marked by ethnic hostilities, as the Socialist party ran a nationalist campaign. Before the election, the Socialists—who were the majority party in the National Assembly—managed to incorporate nationalist language into the constitution and attempted to have the predominantly Turkish party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), declared illegal.

Given these events, it might be difficult to believe the Turks have been incorporated into the political life of the country. Nonetheless, they have been, for two reasons: their party's powerful and consistent base of support, and its strategic maneuvering in parliament.

In both elections the MRF received the third-most seats in parliament. While this did not give the party much power in the first post-Communist legislature, it occupies an important position in the second one, as it can make or break the majority and has done so.

When the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF, a coalition of the other main opposition groups) won the second election, it took only a few more seats than the Socialists and slightly less than a majority. Since the only other party to gain representation in parliament was the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, the UDF was forced into an informal coalition with the Turkish party to assure passage of legislation. Although the MRF agreed to become a low-profile coalition partner, it was soon at loggerheads with the union's leadership, and effectively demanded a more prominent position by joining together with the Socialist party in a vote of no confidence against the UDF-government of Filip Dimitrov.

Thus the Movement for Rights and Freedoms now officially participates in the government, is accepted as a powerful player in parliament—one that neither of the other two parties can ignore, especially now they are both splitting into factions—and is recognized as a legitimate political force in the country. While there are still tensions between Bulgarians and Turks on a personal level, many of the nation's ethnic difficulties are being worked out through government committees and other parliamentary groups rather than through civil disorder or even war. This is a truly positive sign in the Balkans.

## THE END OF MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Bulgaria has been remaking its economy along the lines demanded by the international community, despite severe strains imposed from the outside. The economic transition has been difficult for all the former Communist states of eastern Europe, but Bulgaria has suffered disproportionately from the effects of the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the Persian Gulf War of 1991, and the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia.

Before 1990, the countries of Eastern Europe concentrated on trading within the Soviet bloc through the organizational mechanism of the 10-member CMEA. For instance, in 1987 Poland sent almost one-quarter of its exports to the Soviet Union, and another 19 percent to other nations in Eastern Europe. In 1988, 34 percent of Czechoslovakia's and 20 percent of Hungary's exports went to the Soviet Union, while approximately 27 percent of exports from both countries were shipped to destinations elsewhere in Eastern Europe. For Bulgaria, the concentration of trade was even more pronounced: 85 percent of 1988 exports went to CMEA members—63 percent to the Soviet Union alone. When the CMEA collapsed in 1990–1991, Bulgaria lost its primary trading partners, largely due to the lack of

an organizational mechanism for trade, confusion about currency, and vague economic logic. It had not found new partners to take up the slack. Even the ideological links that had been the foundation of trade relations no longer existed.

In addition to losing its markets, Bulgaria also effectively lost the Soviet Union as its main supplier when President Mikhail Gorbachev began demanding hard currency payments for Soviet exports. Although the CMEA's collapse and the new trade relationship with the Soviet Union affected all the council's members, Bulgaria was hurt the most, insofar as it had the highest concentration of trade with the CMEA states and was the most dependent on energy imports from the Soviet Union.

When the economic and energy crises hit Eastern Europe simultaneously in late 1990, the Bulgarian economy nearly collapsed. Not caught entirely off guard, Bulgaria's leaders had arranged for oil imports from Iraq as repayment for Iraq's hard currency debt to Bulgaria, which amounted to more than \$1 billion (Iraq, Libya, and Syria together owed Bulgaria \$2.36 billion). But when Bulgaria upheld UN sanctions against Iraq, it was forced to forgo the energy imports, along with any hope of repayment from Iraq. Thus Bulgaria was in poor shape economically when it began implementing its structural adjustment program. And the war in what was once Yugoslavia, said to have cost Bulgaria between \$1.2 billion and \$2 billion so far, has exacerbated matters.

Sustaining these blows, Bulgaria has made a valiant effort to initiate and maintain an International Monetary Fund-sponsored adjustment program, despite the severe negative impact on the economy. Even before Bulgaria was admitted into the IMF in 1990, Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov's Socialist government had attempted to show good faith by implementing IMF economic reform programs before the IMF required them. In early 1990 the government announced price increases on 40 percent of goods and 60 percent of services (although prices were frozen on certain staple items such as bread, meat, dairy goods, sugar, cooking oil, and baby food). In addition, the lev (Bulgaria's currency) was formally devalued in March 1990. After the elections that year, Lukanov announced another reform plan, this one formulated in consultation with the IMF, calling for internal convertibility of the lev, price increases, wage controls, and demonopolization and privatization.

Despite the bold reform efforts, there was no substantial improvement in the economy in 1990. Production in the first three quarters declined 13 percent against the same period in 1989, and between May and October inflation increased 30 percent. By the end of the year Bulgaria had a budget deficit approaching 13 percent of gross domestic product, a \$750-million trade deficit, and a balance of payments deficit of \$1.15 billion; gross fixed investment had fallen 18.5

percent. In addition, Bulgaria's foreign debt crisis (\$10 billion in foreign debt, with only \$125 million in foreign exchange reserves) had deepened throughout the year after Lukanov suspended debt servicing.

As 1990 drew to a close, Bulgaria was experiencing political upheaval, largely for economic reasons. A general strike was called and this, in conjunction with a series of demonstrations and protests, toppled the Lukanov government.

By early 1991 the political climate was dramatically different. A new independent prime minister, Dimiter Popov, had formed a coalition government with the Union of Democratic Forces and the Socialist party. Many now believed economic reforms could take root and major changes could be effected. Indeed, the year brought even more dramatic change in the economy, when in February the lev was made internally convertible and retail prices leaped 123 percent. In March the new government approved an economic reform program that was to begin privatization but which would result in a 35 percent drop in real wages.

Nonetheless, 1991 also provided some hopeful signs for economic recovery. In March the IMF announced it would disburse more than \$550 million in loans for Bulgaria, \$109 million of which were intended to offset the oil crisis. Following that, the Paris Club (an informal grouping of the world's largest creditor nations) agreed to reschedule its \$2-billion share of Bulgaria's foreign debt over the next 10 years. Anup Singh, the IMF representative monitoring Bulgaria, pronounced the reforms "sound," the country's first commodity exchange opened its doors, and the World Bank came through with a \$250-million structural adjustment loan.

Still Bulgaria did not seem to be on track. Although the new government had undertaken many initiatives to transform the economic system, and especially to open up opportunities for its most entrepreneurial citizens, the economy was still imploding. Output had fallen 8 percent and real gross domestic product 23 percent in 1991; unemployment was at 10 percent and inflation exceeded 330 percent. Despite new elections in the fall, which the Union of Democratic Forces managed to win outright, the euphoria of the "revolution" was missing. The nation's economic woes weighed heavily on most Bulgarians, and there seemed to be no end in sight.

## ECONOMIC NOSTALGIA

Of course, from an economist's point of view, what was going on was not all discouraging. Bulgaria managed to avoid hyperinflation, and if the number of jobless workers increased this could simply mean that uncompetitive firms were failing. Likewise, the decline in production in the short run could be taken as a natural outcome of structural change, because unprofitable firms curtail production and others might be reluctant to expand investment.

But from the standpoint of average Bulgarians who had become accustomed to the state providing for their primary needs; the process did not appear at all natural. Unfortunately for all these citizens, the situation did not improve in 1992 either. There was another 20 percent drop in overall production—a trend that continued in 1993—and unemployment climbed to 15 percent. The World Bank warned that if large-scale privatization did not get under way, its second disbursement of the previously granted \$250 million would not be forthcoming. The National Assembly responded with a general law on privatization, but by mid-1993 only one large enterprise had been sold. Although by 1992 about 180,000 private firms had been registered in Bulgaria, half were one-person operations.

IMF officials continued to be supportive of the reform. In September 1992 Anup Singh once again praised Bulgaria for meeting IMF standards—and particularly for avoiding high inflation—keeping the lev fairly stable, and maintaining exports at a higher level than expected. Indeed, the situation had apparently improved, as Bulgaria began repaying 25 percent of the overdue interest on its foreign debt. In addition, Bulgaria ended the year with a \$452-million balance of payments surplus.

People were still not happy with the government or parliament, however, and opinion polls revealed a lack of support for the government's determination to work through the crisis. According to polls conducted in September 1992, 69 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with their present "economic situation" and 65 percent with their standard of living; moreover, more than one-quarter expected their standard of living to further decline in the next 12 months. Unsurprisingly, then, many Bulgarians continued to support certain aspects of state welfarism antithetical to reforms: 87 percent agreed it was important to maintain a state welfare system while Bulgaria moved toward a market economy; 83 percent supported full employment; and 76 percent wanted the government to keep food prices down or to subsidize them. Nor were many surprised when the Union of Democratic Forces government fell last autumn.

When the government of Lyuben Berov took over early this year, Bulgaria's relations with the IMF entered a new phase. This phase seemed to be marked more by hostility than cooperation, as demonstrated by the finance minister's threat to suspend cooperation with the fund if he was not allowed to maintain a budget deficit equal to between 8 percent and 10 percent of GNP, and ultimately by the failure to reach a new stand-by agreement with the IMF.

The apparent disagreement between the Bulgarian government and the IMF is understandable. Both political leaders and citizens in Bulgaria felt that they had tried to follow the economic dictates of the international community but that there had simply

been too few positive results. In addition, when Bulgaria had followed the letter and spirit of international demands, it was not rewarded.

Bulgarians felt the economic situation in their country was not in their hands, and so found it difficult to see why they should suffer through further austerity measures. In short, they felt they were damned if they did and damned if they didn't.

## NOT OUR WAR

A similar dilemma has emerged with the war that began in Yugoslavia in 1991. Bulgaria has already lost a great deal of money and stands to lose much more by upholding UN sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), as well as because of the disruption of trade caused by the war. However, it would lose all respect internationally if it did not uphold the sanctions. Many Bulgarians believe some sort of compensation for their trouble is in order, and the UN has technically agreed in principle. Recognition of Bulgaria's plight and financial help to allay its losses must now come from the world community. This, then, leads to consideration of how Bulgaria's future might look.

The country is in a precarious position. It must uphold UN sanctions and endure the ensuing hardships to retain the world's respect. But it must at the same time play a careful diplomatic game with the Serbian leadership in the rump Yugoslavia, to forestall later military or (at the end of the war) economic retaliation. For a country that is expecting unemployment to reach 17 percent, in which 61 percent of people live below the official "social minimum," and that is faced with a hostile Serbian press, these are not simple tasks.

Although to outside observers it might appear unlikely that Bulgaria could be pulled into the Yugoslav war, the probability does not appear so remote to Bulgarians. When asked in a February poll what most concerned them about their future, the highest percentage of Bulgarians (41 percent) said "war."

Given the economic crisis, the perceived danger of the Yugoslav war, and the fact that Bulgaria has made a genuine effort to maintain democratic practices, ethnic participation, and economic change, it seems that strong international support for the country should be forthcoming. Positive reinforcement for what Bulgaria has achieved, rather than punishment or lack of attention to the areas in which so far it has not had success, would make sense. This is especially true because Bulgaria is not merely a country struggling to transform its economy; it is a country that has gone to great lengths and endured significant financial hardship in order to be part of the Western community of nations. With outside support, it could become an important ally in an unstable region. ■

"[T]here is still a dividing line between "Westerners," who see Romania as part of the Western civilization and locate its friends and allies in the Atlantic Basin, and the "Autochthonists," who harbor a distrust of the rest of the world and preach ultranationalist and isolationist dogma. Although this is a schism at least as old as Romania's independence, at present the line divides democrats from neo-Communist conservatives, progress from retrogression."

## Romania: Slamming on the Brakes

BY NESTOR RATESH

Bucharest in early August was rife with rumors and speculation regarding a possible realignment of forces in parliament that would lead to a change of government. Political pros were busy compiling lists of ministers-to-be. The summer parliamentary recess was to last one more hot month and the word was that come September all bets were off.

Things turned out quite differently, however. A minor government reshuffle was all that transpired. Moreover, it appears that nothing of consequence will occur anytime soon. That is very much in line with what Romanian President Ion Iliescu told this author in early July. He showed little interest then in replacing the informal alliance between his party, the Democratic National Salvation Front—later renamed the Party of Social Democracy of Romania—and extremist, ultranationalist, and conservative groups. There is no indication that he has changed his mind, despite an accumulation of serious problems that confront the country at home and internationally.

Indeed, the significant progress made since the revolution of December 1989 has stalled. The government formed in the wake of national elections last September has lacked the political will to vigorously pursue change. This has created institutional and operational deadlock that has slowed economic reform, kept inflation high, lowered the already low standard of living, and led to pervasive corruption, the country's international credibility again losing ground. In late July Romania's negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for new, badly needed credits broke down. In addition, the excessive nationalistic rhetoric of the current parliamentary majority has inflamed political discourse to an extent that seriously

disturbs the legislative and governing processes, while exacerbating interethnic tension.

Dissension rocks the political landscape from the far left to the far right, and splits proliferate. Opinion polls show much dissatisfaction, an erosion of support for democracy, and a penchant for authoritarian options among the people. At no point during the nearly four years of the post-Communist era have real economic and social change, and an overhaul of political arrangements, been so necessary.

### A STEP BACKWARD

Ever since the revolution that toppled Nicolae Ceausescu, Romania has been plagued by a set of paradoxes that have raised questions about the genuineness of the shift and created great uncertainty about the direction in which the nation is heading. Of the Communist states of Eastern and Central Europe, only Romania had a violent revolution, but more of the trappings of communism remain there than in any of the others. Romania was the only country to execute its Communist dictator, but it replaced him as head of state with one of his former subordinates. The Romanian secret police, the infamous Securitate, was formally disbanded, but there seem to be few other former Communist countries in which the (rebuilt and renamed) domestic intelligence services are more powerful. Finally, while nowhere was the economic failure of communism more stunning than in Romania, economic reform there has nevertheless been among the slowest and least robust.

That is not to say there was no change. It came slowly and haltingly, often in response to international prodding, but over time considerable transformation has been accomplished. Whatever its flaws, Romania is an emerging democracy, a fairly pluralistic society with a vibrant independent press, and a stable nation bordering conflict-ridden lands. The confrontational mood that gave rise, after Ceausescu's fall, to demonstrations and violent repression subsided, and has

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been supplanted by a more benign though noisy atmosphere. Certainly the miners are not brought to Bucharest anymore to silence the political opposition, as they were on several occasions after December 1989; instead, the benefits of dialogue are occasionally recognized. There has been some advance toward a free-market economy, and many privately owned stores and restaurants offering an abundance of goods (a large percentage of them imported) enliven the once desolate thoroughfares of Bucharest and other big cities.

Progress has been stalled, however, in the last year or so by a government that is much less committed to pursuing reform, and in fact appears set on preventing it as much as it can. Troubling evidence is available that some of the negative aspects of the transition period have become more pervasive. The Mafia-style takeovers of lucrative private businesses by shadowy characters from the previous regime—mainly former Securitate officers—and the corruption scandals involving some of the political elite, allegedly including members of government, have intensified. Populist and ethnocentric demagoguery exploiting the economic pain Romanians are feeling has moved to the forefront. Under the present government, ethnic minorities, especially Hungarians, Gypsies, and Jews, are facing a more hostile environment than before. Obviously this government reflects the structure of the parliamentary majority that supports it.

The elections last fall created a hung legislature with a dangerous opening for extremist parties—which for the first time won representation in the houses of parliament. These extremist groups are rooted in the far left but espouse a brand of brazen nationalism and xenophobia usually associated with the far right. Senior Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty analyst Michael Shafir calls them parties of “radical continuity,” noting that their “ideological credo combines nostalgia for the regime of Nicolae Ceausescu with extreme nationalist postures.”<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the democratic opposition did not do as well as expected at the polls.

With no single party or alliance in control of a parliamentary majority, President Iliescu, himself re-elected in the presidential runoff last October, opted for a minority government. Essentially dominated by his own left-of-center Party of Social Democracy of Romania, which won a plurality of the popular vote, it included many “politically unaffiliated” though hardly nonpartisan technocrats. The new government received the support of a parliamentary majority that assembled all conservative forces, including the xenophobic and stridently anti-Semitic Greater Romania party; the leftist Socialist Labor party, which considers itself the heir to the disbanded Communist party; and

the anti-Hungarian nationalist Party of Romanian National Unity (PRNU). As far as is known, there was no formal agreement among the different components of the new majority, but the consensus seems to have been to go slow on the economic reforms and to block any attempt by the opposition to get to the levers of power.

It was definitely a serious step backward from the previous parliament, which was by no means ideal, but had a working majority of members in favor of reform at a steady pace, in support of a government with a relatively strong commitment to change. Although the democratic opposition won many more seats in the new parliament, the extremists gained a position from which they were able not only to bring reform almost to a standstill, but also to dominate parliamentary debate, and in the process shape public discourse, sabotage certain international moves by the government, and, most important, spearhead an insidious campaign of restoring the Communist bureaucracy at the local level, and to a certain extent at the national level as well. The damage is truly extensive, and the effects have been felt in many fields. But the economic restructuring and market reform top the list of casualties.

## SHOCK WITHOUT THERAPY

After communism’s fall, Romania started down the road to reform with a terrible legacy and a great handicap. The legacy was an irrationally built, energy-hungry, inefficient, and neglected industry. This was compounded by the total absence of private enterprise and the lack of any kind of head start in economic liberalization before the revolution of 1989. Anything similar to Hungarian “goulash communism” or the Polish private sector under communism were unimaginable in the overcentralized, closed, and oppressed Romania under Ceausescu’s dictatorship. It was to be expected that the restructuring process would be more difficult and the price paid by the population stiffer in Romania. Hard hit by the overnight disappearance of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the prolonged recession in the West, the Romanian economy has also suffered substantial losses as a result of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the Yugoslav embargo.

Afflicted by a deep insecurity—probably caused by the less than immaculate origins of their power in the wake of the December 1989 uprising—Romania’s new leaders allied themselves with those segments of the working class least interested in radical reform. They even made an effort to discredit the very notion of privatization or foreign investments by brandishing the horrors of capitalism and sounding the alarm that the country was about to be sold out to foreigners. They embarked on a long and distracting quest for an “original” path that Romania could follow both in economics and politics—either some adaptation of the “Swedish model” or something called the “social”

<sup>1</sup>Michael Shafir, “Growing Political Extremism in Romania,” *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Report*, no. 14 (April 2, 1993).

market economy—which yielded nothing but ideological confusion and retarded the inevitable fundamental changes.

As former Minister of State for Reform and Economic Strategy Misu Negritoiu has noted, the slower the pace of reform, the higher the price. The available data proves Negritoiu's point. Poland, now the leading example of successful shock therapy, removed almost all controls over prices in one sweeping act in January 1990 that sent the inflation rate skyrocketing to 585 percent that year. But then inflation decreased rapidly to much more manageable levels: 70 percent in 1991, 43 percent in 1992, and 35 percent this year. Under a gradualist approach, Romania began its price liberalization in November 1990 and will end it next year. Currently inflation is running at an annual rate of about 200 percent, after 210.4 percent in 1992 and 161.1 percent in 1991. When the Poles liberalized prices, they also withdrew subsidies to state-owned factories. As a result, unemployment went from 6.3 percent in 1990 to 14.9 percent this year. The jobless rate in Romania has stayed at just under 10 percent of the work force for the last two years, but much of state-owned industry, which accounts for 90 percent of the country's production, is still heavily subsidized. In the last two years the Polish economy has been expanding (with projected growth of 5.1 percent this year), while the Romanian economy has gone through five years of contraction. Government statistics suggest that the decline in industrial production was halted in April, but production for the first half of 1993 was still 7.5 percent behind the same period last year. Industrial production is now about half what it was before the revolution.

Perhaps the most vexing casualty of the government's stalling policy has been movement on freeing the economy of the many enterprises that are kept alive artificially and at great cost to the country. These concerns have access to cheap credit through a system of negative real interest rates and are propped up by a host of awkward measures that fuel inflation, undermine financial discipline, and starve the emerging private sector of capital. Although according to some estimates about half of state-owned enterprises are insolvent and must be subsidized, none has yet declared bankruptcy. There is not even a bankruptcy law, the majority in parliament having delayed a vote on such a measure, fearing a chain reaction with unpalatable social dislocation—and severe political consequences for itself.

On the other hand, privatization is hardly an option for all these money-losing units. In any event, there have been few or no attempts at privatization even in the most competitive segments of Romanian industry. Especially under the two previous governments, small-scale privatization advanced steadily, mostly in retailing and services. Nevertheless, the contribution of

private enterprise to Romania's gross domestic product is now only between 15 percent and 25 percent, depending on which source is used. As for land reform, 70 to 80 percent of farmland was returned to private ownership, and agricultural production this year is said to be reasonably good, although many problems still plague the countryside.

Gradualism provided little relief to Romania's people, but only prolonged their suffering; as Michael Dobbs of *The Washington Post* put it, "they experienced the shock without the therapy." Furthermore, domestic critics accuse the present government of simply ignoring market instruments altogether in favor of state interference that threatens macroeconomic stability.

International organizations agree. Romania's talks with the IMF on a new standby arrangement and access to the recently created Systemic Transformation Facility foundered in July, mainly over the IMF's concern with the pace of the Romanian economic reform, especially in the restructuring of state-owned industry, and with the erratic, inflation-fueling monetary and budget policies. It was a serious setback for Romania, which faces a financial squeeze with the potential loss of some \$3 billion in loans from a variety of international creditors whose worries parallel those of the IMF. This kind of skepticism also keeps away foreign investors. Total foreign investments in Romania now stand at a mere \$660 million (one-fifth what Hungary, for example, was able to attract). When an important deal is finalized at last, it turns out to be a fraud, as was the case with the recent sale of Petromin, Romania's main shipping company, to a little-known Greek concern.

Other scandals jolted the political scene during the summer and fall, and a special session of parliament convened in late August to deal with the issue of corruption. All agreed corruption was widespread and entrenched, but members differed on who was to blame. An opposition censure motion against several ministers accused of corruption by the former head of the Financial Guard (an audacity that cost him his job) was defeated by a comfortable margin.

## THE OPPOSITION'S BUSINESS

There is little doubt the nation needs the relief that should come with a change of government. Normally the lingering economic woes, the lack of progress, and the people's anguish should bring the government down and force a realignment in parliament. There is little indication that this is about to happen. Labor unrest has intensified somewhat, but does not seem to be a major threat to the government at this point. General dissatisfaction with economic conditions and with the government is discernible among citizens (more than 60 percent of respondents described the government's performance as "poor" in a recent

survey), although this does not seem to translate into any decisive movement.

Some argue that the conservative coalition could have been avoided in the first place had the democratic opposition accepted Iliescu's offer to form a national unity government after the general elections. The seriousness and sincerity of the offer were never tested; instead, the opposition's strategy was to let the president and his party take full responsibility for exercising power at a difficult juncture, and bear the consequences for it. With hindsight, many now agree that the strategy backfired, sapping the opposition's credibility and allowing for a restoration of old nomenklatura types at all levels of government. During the summer, quite a few leaders of the opposition signaled to this author their willingness to try their hand in government, or at least showed an inclination to support from the outside a government more attuned to the needs of the country and more committed to reform.

For much of the post-Communist period, the only authentic opposition was made up of the reconstituted "historical" parties—the National Peasant Christian Democratic party, the National Liberal party and its offshoots, and the Social Democratic Party of Romania, which were joined later by a new Party of Civil Alliance. At the end of 1991, these parties and a dozen smaller groups, including the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania, formed the Democratic Convention, which scored major victories in most of the big cities in local elections held in February 1992. It ran again as an electoral cartel in the September 1992 national elections, this time winning roughly the same share of the popular vote (28 percent) as in the local elections, but falling short of forecasts predicting at least a plurality of votes for the alliance.

The opposition grew in the spring of 1992 with the addition of a new party, the split-off reformist faction of the ruling National Salvation Front, led by ousted Prime Minister Petre Roman. The other faction, faithful to Iliescu, formed the Democratic National Salvation Front, later to be renamed, as previously mentioned, the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PSDR). This June the Democratic Party-National Salvation Front, as it came to be known, forged an alliance with the Democratic Convention that could potentially rally 47 percent of the seats in parliament. This is a formidable force for change. Can it be harnessed?

Certain opportunities may emerge, but the obstacles could prove hard to surmount. High on the list of opportunities is the possibility of a rift within the conservative majority. The relationship between Iliescu's party and its allies has been uneasy and sometimes stormy. The president has at times been the target of harsh criticism by the extremist groups. He came under fierce attack in April for his attendance at a Holocaust commemoration ceremony at the Bucharest Coral Temple and for his trip to Washington for the

opening of the Holocaust Museum; leaders of two of the extremist parties, namely the anti-Semitic Greater Romania party and the Communist Socialist Labor party, were so enraged that they publicly accused the president of being "called to order" by the Jews, who, they said, had brought him to power and kept him there "at the price of Romania being wrecked at its very foundation."

At about the same time, the PRNU, which is the largest of the minor partners in the informal coalition, unexpectedly blasted the government for some of its policies. It requested for the first time direct participation in government and control of the major departments dealing with the reform, giving the prime minister until the end of September to comply with the request or lose the party's support in parliament.

How this contest will be resolved is not clear at the time of this writing. The PRNU is said to be different from the two other extremist parties in certain respects, including the presence of a seemingly more moderate faction whose anti-Hungarian nationalism would not necessarily rule out a commitment to democracy and economic reform; this faction, however, has exhibited few signs of life until very recently. Whether the party's bid for government positions is more than a tactical maneuver remains to be seen.

A significant question mark is the size and influence of the pro-reform faction within the PSDR, and its relationship with Iliescu. The party's national congress, held in July, appeared to enhance the status of this faction. Its principal exponent, former Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, was elected party leader, but so far there have been no openings or new policies bearing the imprint of the supposed reformists. The reshuffle of the government in late August was a mixed bag. If anything, it enhanced the position of the conservatives and ultranationalists. On the other hand, the fact that ousted Minister of Reform Misu Negritoiu, whose sharp differences with Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu on economic policies are now in the public record, was appointed adviser to the president leads some observers to think a kind of implausible polarization has taken place within ruling circles, with conservatives gathering around Vacaroiu and reformists around Iliescu. The president is also credited with forcing the appointment of a known reformist, Mircea Cosea, to replace Negritoiu in the government.

If these moves are indicative that Iliescu is moving closer to reform-minded forces, why is the president not allowing for a change of government to conform to his political leanings? A pact between the PSDR and the opposition would definitely make for a large majority in parliament for a government dedicated to reform. Yet the president did not show any eagerness for such an arrangement when talking with this author, nor in any of his subsequent public utterances.

The president may be more amenable to an arrange-

ment that would keep his party in command of the government, while reconstituting the parliamentary majority that supports it so as to exclude extremist parties. Such a solution was suggested to Iliescu, in confidential talks, by Corneliu Coposu, leader of the main component of the Democratic Convention, the National Peasant Christian Democratic party. It does not, however, seem to have the backing of the rest of the opposition, which is riven by splits, rivalries, and bickering, with personality counting for more than policies in a terrain strewn with dead and discarded ideologies.

### THE REQUEST THAT WASN'T: THE FOREIGN DIMENSION

In the end, the thrust for change may come—as it has many times in the past several years—from outside the country.

In late July an unexpected request from Bill Clinton broke the monotony of the Bucharest summer: the United States president asked that early national elections be held in Romania as proof that the country was continuing to strive for a democratic, pluralistic society. The request, reported by a Romanian newspaper almost two months after it was made, appeared in a routine letter the president sent to Congress on June 2, soliciting its approval of the United States–Romanian Trade Agreement, concluded more than a year before and previously rejected by the House of Representatives. The agreement provides for, among other things, the granting of most favored nation trade status (MFN) to Romania—an elusive trophy that successive Romanian governments have been seeking for years. The request took everyone by surprise, considering that the last national elections, recognized by the United States and the rest of the world as free and fair, had been held nine months earlier, and that no political group in Romania had contemplated yet another election so soon.

It turned out, however, that the sentence suggesting early elections had been mistakenly carried over from last year's presidential letter on the same subject—which, quite appropriately, appealed for such a vote at a time when the Romanian government kept delaying it. The American ambassador to Romania, John Davis, Jr., promptly acknowledged the mistake, and said Washington was not adding any new conditions for granting MFN.

The incident would probably have produced little in Romania beyond sarcastic jokes and scathing commentaries in the press had it not come at a time of political deadlock and intense jockeying for power. As it was, the Clinton administration's flub paved the way for potentially useful developments. The ambassador's correction notwithstanding, the desirability of ahead-of-schedule elections began to be discussed seriously in Romanian political circles. Interestingly enough, some

politicians hurried to discreetly embrace the idea, not because they really wanted early elections, but simply because they were suggested, albeit inadvertently, by the United States.

It should surprise nobody that an American request invited such a response. In fact, hardly any major change in Romania after the end of Communist rule has occurred without encouragement and prodding from abroad. In search of recognition and, when possible, a warm embrace as well as much-needed credits and aid, the new Romanian leadership was amenable to advice, criticism, and admonition from the West. This is how the IMF became a true engine of economic reform in Romania, while pressure from Western powers kept the political reforms going.

The need for external pushes and shoves before it took action that in other eastern and central European countries came naturally, out of an indigenous impetus for change, hurt Romania's relations with both the United States and western Europe. This, combined with the presence of former Communists at the helm of the ship of state, the initial political and ethnic violence after Ceausescu's fall, the shadowy presence of the security police, and the government's control of the electronic media, kept Romania on probation internationally for a rather long time. As the country made progress in building a pluralist society and a market economy, relations with the West improved considerably. But skepticism was renewed with the election of the bloc of die-hard Communist nostalgics to the new parliament. The alliance between the leading party and the extremists greatly damaged the image Romania wanted to project abroad, deepening the suspicions of foreign countries and international organizations just when Romania could have benefited from the more stable domestic situation, its holding of free and fair elections, an improved human rights record, and enhanced strategic significance to the West due to the Yugoslav crisis. Consequently, even at the time of this writing, almost four years after the fall of the dictatorship, Romania is still deprived of two basic symbols of Western acceptance—namely membership in the Council of Europe and most favored nation status in the United States. Both may finally come later this year, but as things stand now this is by no means assured.

In fact, the latest developments in interethnic relations may raise major obstacles both in Strasbourg, home of the Council of Europe, and in Washington. The most serious is a memorandum in which the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (HDFR), the main political organization of the Hungarian minority, asked the Council of Europe to review Romania's treatment of ethnic minorities before admitting the country into its ranks. The memo states that "so long as the necessary changes in its government system fail to materialize and the activity of its basic institutions is inadequate, Romania does not essentially fulfill the

conditions for membership in the Council of Europe." This was interpreted as amounting to a request to deny Romania's application for full membership in the council, an interpretation that the HDFR has denied. Nevertheless, it embroiled the HDFR in a bitter dispute with both its foes in the nationalist camp and its allies in the Democratic Convention; all parties across the political spectrum condemned its stand. Relations between ethnic groups were not very good in any case, the nationalistic excesses of the government and its parliamentary supporters having triggered a certain radicalization within the HDFR. The Hungarian minority, 1.6 million strong (7.1 percent of the population), has a long list of complaints and claims, foremost among them the charge that the government treats Hungarians like second-class citizens and restricts the use of their language in education, the administration of justice, and public life.

The minority issue is by no means less important in Washington. The way it plays in Strasbourg would certainly influence the decision by Congress on whether to approve Clinton's recommendation to grant Romania most favored nation status. When the House of Representatives rejected MFN for Romania a year ago, lobbying by Hungarian groups was an important factor, although others may have counted more: the vote in the House took place within days of the Romanian national elections, when the disappointing results and charges of electoral fraud (inaccurate, it turned out) were just reaching Washington.

This year, other issues may come to the forefront. Romania's geographic location lends it enhanced significance for United States interests in the area. In addition to being a key player in the enforcement of the UN embargo against neighboring Serbia and Montenegro (the rump Yugoslavia), Romania potentially has considerable geopolitical value to the United States as the largest country in the Balkans since the disintegration of the former Yugoslav federation, a land—and perhaps in the future an agent—of stability in a volatile region bordering the western periphery of the former Soviet Union.

The Yugoslav war to the west and the latent conflict in the trans-Dniester area of Moldova to the east, create both dangers and opportunities for Romania. The opportunities are mostly for Romania's relations with the West, geopolitical usefulness being expected to override domestic drawbacks. Romanian leaders certainly count on it, and some observers suspect that Iliescu and the government plan on playing their "external card" so as to extract the desired recognition from the West without having to change much domestically. As for the dangers, the consensus seems to be that the threat of a spillover of the Yugoslav crisis is pretty much contained at this time. The UN embargo, however, costs the Romanian economy billions of

dollars in lost trade and other hardships. The problem in Moldova is more worrisome to Romania, not because of its geographic proximity, but primarily because of the kinship between the two states. (Moldova is mostly former Romanian territory annexed by Stalin under the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.)

Romania has avoided direct involvement in the sometimes bloody conflict between Moldovan authorities and the self-proclaimed secessionist Dniester Republic, which occupies territory on the left bank of the Dniester, where the Fourteenth Russian (formerly Soviet) Army is stationed. When this author visited the area in mid-July, few signs of military activity were visible. The place looks very much like a Soviet enclave, with all the Communist paraphernalia and behavior, rather than the ethnic refuge for Russians and Ukrainians that the separatist leaders claim it is. It was a frightening and instructive journey in the not so distant past.

Romania and Moldova follow a mutually agreed-on policy predicated on the existence of two "Romanian states." They are developing a close and special relationship, but experience a certain uneasiness, if not mutual suspicion. In both countries there are Romanian nationalist movements supporting immediate reunification—somewhat stronger in Romania, quite weak in Moldova. But there is no enthusiasm among the populace and certainly at the government level for such a bold move at this time, either in Romania or in Moldova. The geopolitical environment is less than propitious, given the overwhelming concern in both the East and the West with continuity and stability. Moldova tends to oscillate between Romania, where its ethnic, linguistic, and historical ties lie, and the Commonwealth of Independent States, where its vital economic interests dwell. It would take great diplomatic skills not immediately apparent in Chisinau, the Moldovan capital, to keep the competing interests in balance.

By and large there is a consensus across the political spectrum in Romania on the main immediate foreign policy objectives. All parties (possibly with the distinct exception of the Hungarian Democratic Federation) are now in favor of the United States granting MFN to Romania and the Council of Europe admitting the country as a full member. But there is still a dividing line between "Westerners," who see Romania as part of the Western civilization and locate its friends and allies in the Atlantic Basin, and the "Autochthonists," who harbor a distrust of the rest of the world and preach ultranationalist and isolationist dogma. Although this is a schism at least as old as Romania's independence, at present the line divides democrats from neo-Communist conservatives, progress from retrogression. ■

# BOOK REVIEWS

## ON THE BALKANS

### The Other Balkan Wars

*By the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars.* Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1993. 450 pp., \$15.95.

"Disturbing as the situation was, the information coming in from the area of hostilities was still for the most part fragmentary, indirect and unsatisfactory. Little of it was reliable. It was hard to know how to distinguish fact from fiction, reality from exaggeration, the known from the merely alleged. Before far-reaching decisions could be made, one had to gain a clearer picture of what was happening."

Sound familiar? Eighty years ago, as hostilities in the second Balkan War came to an end, members of a commission appointed by the Carnegie Endowment arrived in the Balkans to begin compiling information on the fighting between Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks over the spoils they, as allies, had won in the first Balkan War against the Turks in 1912.

The commission's findings, reprinted here with a masterful introduction by George Kennan, were released in the summer of 1914. The outbreak of World War I quickly turned the commission's findings into historical curiosities, but renewed hostilities in the region—and the similarities and differences between then and now—make their republication a welcome addition to the process of understanding the Balkans and the passions that motivate the savagery that has marked wars in the region.

Perhaps the most telling comment about the report's value comes from Kennan, who notes in his introduction that for all its defects in reportage and structure, the report "may stand, in its entirety, as one of the most eloquent and compelling pleas for recognition of the folly of modern war and the essentiality of international peace, not just in the Balkans but everywhere in the civilized world."

William W. Finan, Jr.

### The Destruction of Yugoslavia:

### Tracking the Breakup, 1980-92

*By Branka Magas.* New York: Verso, 1993. 366 pp., \$19.95.

Magas, a journalist with a firm grasp of Yugoslav history, a sure sense of Croatian nationalism, and an unbridled anger at Serbian aggression in Croatia and Bosnia, has written an entirely undispassionate account of the rise of Milosevic and the "ethnic cleansing" and brutality he has helped unleash in the former Yugoslavia. It is an account well worth reading. The

writings collected here by the author trace the evolution of her views on the Yugoslav idea and its undoing by the likes of Milosevic in such a way that one can begin to understand how positions have hardened among the actors in the breakup of Yugoslavia.

W. W. F.

### Balkan Ghosts:

### A Journey Through History

*By Robert D. Kaplan.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. 307 pp., \$22.95.

### Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia

*By Lenard J. Cohen.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993. 299 pp., \$49.95, cloth; \$16.95, paper.

*Balkan Ghosts* is an ambitious attempt to weave history and travelogue (the latter not a pejorative) into a political portrait of the Balkans. Kaplan, a fluid writer with an exceptional ability to capture the human dimension of politics in the Balkans, has made Rebecca West's 1941 classic about her travels in Yugoslavia, *Black Lamb and Gray Falcon*, a companion in an ongoing dialogue about the seemingly unchanged beliefs and attitudes that motivate the conflict in that country today and propel political life throughout the rest of the Balkans. By no means a scholarly work—nor intended to be one—*Balkan Ghosts* is a very personal and riveting account of a region to which the author had tried to call the West's attention long before the present crises.

For those who do want a scholarly study of the Yugoslav breakdown, political scientist Lenard Cohen offers a rigorous yet accessible treatment of the country's collapse. A brief introductory history of the "first" and "second" Yugoslavias is followed by a full and compelling account of the events and attitudes that led to the crisis and the ongoing conflict in Bosnia.

W. W. F.

## ALSO RECEIVED ON EUROPE

### The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century

*Edited by Joseph Held.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 435 pp., \$16.50.

### The Walls Came Tumbling Down:

### The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe

*By Gale Stokes.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 319 pp., \$52.00, cloth; \$21.50, paper.

### The Shape of the New Europe

*Edited by Gregory F. Treverton.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992. 224 pp., \$16.95.

# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

September 1993

## INTERNATIONAL

### Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (See *Azerbaijan*)

#### International Olympic Committee

Sept. 23—The committee turns down Beijing's bid to host the Summer Olympics in the year 2000, and votes to hold the games in Sydney, Australia.

#### Middle East Peace Conference

Sept. 9—In letters exchanged today, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO chairman Yasir Arafat recognize the PLO and the state of Israel as legitimate entities; Arafat also announces the PLO will renounce the use of violence.

Sept. 13—In Washington, Rabin and Arafat shake hands after Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO foreign affairs spokesperson Mahmoud Abbas sign a Declaration of Principles regarding Palestinian self-rule.

Sept. 14—In Washington, Israeli negotiator Elyakim Rubinstein and Fayed Tarawneh, Jordan's ambassador to the US, sign an agreement that calls for Arab nations and Israel to work toward peace.

#### Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

(See *Intl. Middle East Peace Conference*)

#### United Nations (UN)

(See also *Bosnia; Haiti; Somalia*)

Sept. 22—In a unanimous vote, the Security Council passes a resolution that will end UN peacekeeping in Somalia in March 1995.

Sept. 23—The Security Council votes unanimously to send 1,200 troops and police officers to Haiti to help with its transition to a democratic government.

## AFGHANISTAN

Sept. 14—Militant Hezb-i-Islami fighters loyal to Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar shell the eastern suburbs of Kabul.

Sept. 27—Leaders of the guerrilla groups that ousted Communist President Najibullah in April 1992 agree to an interim constitution that is to serve until elections are held sometime next year. At least 17 people were killed and scores more wounded in factional fighting in Kabul last week.

## ANGOLA

Sept. 13—The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) delegation in Portugal announces that the group will begin a unilateral cease-fire September 20 to promote new peace talks in the 18-year-old civil war.

## ARMENIA

(See *Azerbaijan; Turkey*)

## AUSTRALIA

(See *Intl. International Olympic Committee*)

## AZERBAIJAN

Sept. 4—The Defense Ministry says ethnic Armenian forces from the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh today captured the town of Goradiz, near the Iranian border; a spokesman for Nagorno-Karabakh denies there has been military activity in the region.

Sept. 20—Parliament votes, 31 to 13, with 1 abstention, to rejoin the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Sept. 25—In talks in Moscow mediated by Russia, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan meet for the 1st time in an effort to end the fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh.

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Sept. 12—State radio says 2 days of Croat artillery attacks on Mostar have killed at least 10 people.

Sept. 16—Croat forces launch attacks on Mostar and the central towns of Vitez, Jablanica, and Vitez.

Sept. 19—Croat forces continue to shell Mostar; yesterday, 19 people were killed and another 26 wounded by Croat artillery attacks on the city.

Sept. 27—In Velika Kladusa, in the northwestern Muslim enclave of Bihać, a 400-member constituent assembly votes to make Bihać an autonomous province within Bosnia and names Fikret Abdic—1 of Bosnia's 10 presidents in its collective presidency and a rival of President Alija Izetbegovic—the province's president.

Sept. 29—The predominantly Muslim Bosnian parliament rejects a recent UN/EC peace plan agreed to by President Izetbegovic last month by a 65 to 4 vote; 7 legislators reject the plan outright and 58 request it be returned to UN and EC negotiators.

## CAMBODIA

Sept. 21—The National Assembly adopts a new constitution that provides for a king with as yet undetermined powers over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

Sept. 24—In Phnom Penh, Prince Norodom Sihanouk ratifies the new constitution and again becomes king of Cambodia.

Sept. 25—Prince Ranariddh calls on Khieu Samphan, the titular leader of the Khmer Rouge, to surrender Pailin, the group's stronghold in northern Cambodia; the Khmer Rouge, which opted out of a 1991 peace pact that the country's 4 main factions agreed to, controls about 20% of Cambodia's territory.

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Sept. 1—The Supreme Court announces the results of the presidential election held August 22; final tallies show that General André Kolingba, the military ruler, came in 4th, with 12.1% of the vote; former Prime Minister Ange-Félix Patasse, who finished 1st, with 37.3%, and opposition leader Abel Goumba, the runner-up, will compete in a runoff September 12.

## CHINA

(See also *Intl. International Olympic Committee*)

Sept. 4—At the Saudi Arabian port of Damman, US, Chinese, and Saudi representatives certify that a detained Chinese

freighter has no illicit cargo aboard; US intelligence reports said the vessel was carrying materials for the production of poison gas to Iran; the Chinese Foreign Ministry condemns "self-styled world cop behavior" by the US.

Sept. 20—In Beijing, Wei Jingsheng, China's best-known dissident, appears publicly for the 1st time since his release from prison last week, 6 months before the end of his 14 1/2-year sentence for anti-government activities during the 1978–1979 Democracy Wall movement.

## CROATIA

Sept. 9—Government troops breach UN-demarcated lines and capture the southern villages of Divoselo, Citluk, and Poctelj. The army says the offensive is in retaliation for today's Serb militia attacks between Karlovac, a town south of Zagreb, the capital, and the Adriatic coastline that left 4 dead and 36 wounded and that also crossed UN-imposed lines.

Sept. 12—Serb militias fire rockets on Jastrebarsko and Samobor, 2 towns near Zagreb, wounding about 3 people.

## CUBA

(See US)

## EGYPT

Sept. 25—A police officer is shot and killed by gunmen in the village of Nazlet Bakour in southern Asyut province; 8 other police officers have been assassinated this month; police suspect members of the militant Islamic Group.

## GEORGIA

Sept. 14—After Eduard Shevardnadze resigns as president because his request for emergency powers had not been met, Parliament approves emergency rule for a 2-month period.

Sept. 15—Shevardnadze flies to Mingrelia province in western Georgia, where fighters loyal to ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia are fighting government troops; he says 7 soldiers and 2 civilians were killed early today when forces under Lotti Kobalia, the former commander of the National Guard, attacked government positions about 175 miles west of Tbilisi.

Sept. 16—In Abkhazia province in the northwest, separatist rebels mount a surprise offensive against the regional capital of Sukhumi, breaking a Russian-guaranteed cease-fire signed July 28; Georgia had withdrawn troops and heavy weaponry under the accord.

Sept. 19—Shevardnadze, now in Sukhumi, appeals on the steps of the local parliament building for international intervention and armed Georgian volunteers; rebels have encircled the city and are shelling it from mountain positions.

Sept. 20—Two SU-25 fighters bomb Georgian positions on the Black Sea coast; Abkhazian forces are not known to have any planes; Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev withdraws Russia's offer to send 2 battalions of peacekeepers to the area.

Sept. 22—Georgian officials report a heat-seeking missile fired from a gunboat in the Black Sea manned by Abkhazian separatists caused the crash in Sukhumi today of a plane carrying relief supplies from Tbilisi; 80 people are said to have been killed. A missile downed another passenger plane near Sukhumi yesterday, killing all 28 aboard; Abkhazian fighters said they were not responsible.

Sept. 25—Gamsakhurdia pledges to suspend his war against the government.

Sept. 26—More than 300 Georgian troops and civilians have been killed in the renewed fighting in Abkhazia, *The New*

*York Times* reports, and more than 2,000 wounded; 12 Russian soldiers have also died.

Sept. 27—Sukhumi falls to rebel forces. Shevardnadze, who at one point rallied troops waving a pistol, left the city only a short time before; he issues a statement saying he had sent a telegram to Moscow pledging Georgia would join the Commonwealth of Independent States if Russia would send troops to relieve Sukhumi.

Sept. 30—Abkhazian rebel forces seize Ochamchira, 40 miles south of Sukhumi, and Gali, 20 miles farther south; tens of thousands of refugees are fleeing the region; Russia evacuated about 10,000 earlier in the week.

## GERMANY

Sept. 9—The Bundesbank cuts its discount rate for loans to commercial banks 0.5%, to 6.25%, and its Lombard rate for emergency loans to banks from 7.75% to 7.25%; the bank's refusal 6 weeks ago to reduce the former rate brought on the collapse of the European Monetary System. Central banks in Spain, Italy, Austria, and Belgium follow suit.

Sept. 16—In a Berlin court, 3 former East German leaders are found guilty of incitement to manslaughter in the deaths of a few of the approximately 600 citizens killed trying to flee the country during the years under Communist rule.

## GREECE

Sept. 9—After his governing New Democracy party loses its majority in parliament, Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis dissolves the body and calls general elections, 7 months ahead of schedule; former Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras has led a revolt against the party over Greece's failure to stop Macedonia from calling itself by the name of a Greek province, as well as over the government's privatization program.

## HAITI

(See also *Intl, UN*)

Sept. 2—Prime Minister Robert Malval installs his cabinet, formally ending the period of military rule that began 2 years ago this month when President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was deposed in a coup; Aristide is expected to resume his post on October 30.

Sept. 8—Outside the city hall in Port-au-Prince, the capital, 5 people are killed and several are wounded as police officers and others shoot and beat civilians gathered for a ceremony marking the return of Mayor Evans Paul, a supporter of Aristide who has been in hiding during Aristide's absence.

## INDIA

Sept. 10—At least 6 members of the Maoist People's War Group and a paramilitary policeman are killed in a daylong firefight in the village of Padkal in Andhra Pradesh state.

Sept. 11—A car bomb explosion near the parliament building in New Delhi kills at least 8 people and wounds 36; police say they suspect Sikh terrorists.

Sept. 30—Indian television reports an estimated 10,000 people were killed in an earthquake measuring 6.4 on the Richter scale that struck a rural area of Maharashtra state in central India this morning.

## IRAN

(See *China*)

## IRAQ

Sept. 5—President Saddam Hussein replaces Prime Minister Mohammed Hamza al-Zubaidi with Ahmed Hussein Khu-

dayyir, who had been finance minister; 8 other cabinet officials are also replaced.

## ISRAEL

(See also *Intl. Middle East Peace Conference; Lebanon; Morocco*)

Sept. 6—In the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip, 1 Palestinian is killed and another wounded by Israeli soldiers during a Palestinian demonstration against the proposed peace plan between the Israeli government and the PLO that would allow for limited Palestinian self-government in Gaza and in the Israeli-occupied West Bank city of Jericho.

Sept. 11—In the West Bank town of Ramallah, Israeli soldiers kill 2 Palestinians and wound 7 others during a demonstration against recent negotiations between the PLO and Israel.

Sept. 12—In Gaza, 3 Israeli soldiers are ambushed and killed by members of the Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the militant Islamic group Hamas, which is opposed to the recent accords between the PLO and the Israeli government.

Also in Gaza, a Palestinian driving a booby-trapped car is killed when his vehicle collides with an Israeli Prison Service bus; 2 of the bus passengers are injured.

On a bus traveling between the coastal towns of Ashkelon and Ashdod, a Palestinian stabs the driver to death and is then shot and killed by an Israeli soldier he had wounded.

In Rafah, in southern Gaza, a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a PLO faction opposed to the recent Middle East peace negotiations, is killed when a grenade he is carrying explodes as he flees Israeli soldiers; 2 other people are wounded by the blast.

Sept. 21—Abu Shaaban, a leader of PLO chairman Yasir Arafat's Fatah faction in Gaza, is assassinated by unknown gunmen as he drives home from a rally in support of the recent PLO-Israeli accord.

Sept. 23—The Knesset endorses the recent Israeli-PLO accord by a 61-50 vote, with 8 abstentions and 1 absence.

Sept. 26—In Gaza, 1 Palestinian believed to be a Hamas member is killed by a car bomb in what appears to be a botched suicide attack.

## JAPAN

Sept. 16—Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa announces a \$57-billion emergency stimulus program for the economy, the 3d in 13 months in Japan, which is in its worst economic downturn in at least 20 years; the plan, which is about half the size of the 2 previous ones, includes some \$19 billion for public works projects and \$28 billion in low-interest loans for homebuyers.

## JORDAN

(See *Intl. Middle East Peace Conference*)

## LEBANON

Sept. 13—At demonstrations against today's signing of a peace accord between the PLO and the Israeli government in Beirut, government troops kill 8 protesters and wound at least 35 others; the dead were members of the Iran-backed Party of God militant Muslim group.

Sept. 14—In Israel's self-declared security zone in the south, Party of God guerrillas launch 6 attacks, wounding 1 Israeli soldier and 5 militiamen who belong to the Israel-backed South Lebanon Army.

## MEXICO

Sept. 17—In a special session of Congress, legislators pass, by a 316 to 184 vote, electoral reforms that place the country's 1st limitations on campaign fund raising, grants greater ac-

cess by opposition parties to news media, and lessens government control over electoral bodies.

## MOROCCO

Sept. 14—Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin arrives in Rabat to hold discussions with King Hassan II; this is the 1st public visit by an Israeli prime minister to an Arab country other than Egypt.

## NICARAGUA

Sept. 22—In the 2d day of violence during a strike in Managua, the capital, thousands of people protest new taxes on vehicles and fuel imposed by the government of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro; yesterday, 1 police officer and 1 woman were killed in a shootout, 20 others were wounded, and 50 demonstrators were arrested.

Sept. 24—After 4 days of a nationwide transportation strike, the government announces it will repeal the vehicle tax and will reduce the fuel tax on transportation workers.

## NIGERIA

Sept. 6—The oil workers union suspends its 10-day strike to protest the government's refusal to publish the results of the annulled presidential election in June, saying it is giving leaders time to reconsider; the oil industry accounts for more than 95% of the country's hard currency earnings.

## PHILIPPINES

Sept. 24—In an anti-corruption court in Manila, Imelda Marcos and a former transportation minister are found guilty of entering into "unfavorable" lease contracts with a public hospital; Marcos is sentenced to 18 to 24 years in prison.

## POLAND

Sept. 25—Final results from parliamentary elections held September 19 show that the Democratic Left Alliance, the successor to the Polish Communist party, won 171 seats in the 460-seat lower house, with 20.4% of the vote; the Polish Peasants party, another former Communist party, won 132 seats, with 15.4% of the vote; the centrist Democratic Union, Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka's party, won 74 seats, with 10.6% of the vote; turnout was 52.1%, 10% more than in 1991.

## RUSSIA

(See also *Azerbaijan; Georgia; Ukraine*)

Sept. 2—In Washington, Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and US Vice President Albert Gore sign formal pacts on space and missile technology. In the documents, the US and Russia agree to merge their programs for manned space stations; Russia also agrees to impose export controls on missile technology.

Sept. 3—After a day of talks at Massandra, Ukraine, Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk agree that Russia will buy Ukraine's half of the 350-ship Black Sea Fleet; Yeltsin says Ukraine's \$2.5-billion debt to Russia for oil and gas will be deducted from the unspecified purchase amount; Russia's use of the naval base at Sevastopol, the fleet's home port, and the fee for this, are still under negotiation. In addition, Ukraine agrees to transfer the 176 strategic nuclear missiles remaining on its territory to Russia for dismantling, in return for the extracted uranium, which Ukraine will use in its nuclear power plants.

Voting 141 to 10, parliament passes a measure suspending a September 1 decree by Yeltsin that removed Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi and first deputy prime minister

Vladimir Shumeiko from their posts while allegations of corruption against both are investigated.

Sept. 8—In Washington Russia's defense minister, General Pavel Grachev, signs an accord on military cooperation that includes provision for joint peacekeeping exercises involving a US and a Russian army division; this will be the 1st time that Russian and US ground troops have trained together.

Sept. 16—Yeltsin says Yegor Gaidar, the architect of the post-Communist economic reform whom parliament forced him to drop as acting prime minister in December, will become first deputy prime minister, in charge of the economy.

Sept. 21—In an address on national television and in a decree published shortly afterward, Yeltsin, saying the Soviet-era constitution allows no resolution of the current "ruinous, vicious" "deadlock" in government, declares that he is dissolving the parliament, which he says "has ceased to be an organ of rule by the people"; he announces new parliamentary elections for December. Ruslan Khasbulatov, the speaker of parliament, terms Yeltsin's action a "state coup d'état" and orders the armed forces and the police to disregard any orders from Yeltsin.

Sept. 22—The Supreme Soviet, the standing parliament, votes overwhelmingly to depose Yeltsin, and Rutskoi is sworn in as acting president. Rutskoi nullifies all decrees issued by Yeltsin yesterday; Yeltsin nullifies decrees issued by Rutskoi today. Several thousand Communist demonstrators rally outside the parliament building, or Russian White House. The army declares its neutrality. The Constitutional Court upholds the Supreme Soviet's decisions and rules that Yeltsin's actions are grounds for impeachment.

Sept. 23—In Moscow, an emergency session of the Congress of People's Deputies votes, 636 to 2, to formally oust Yeltsin; the government dismisses the session as a meeting of private citizens. Yeltsin says new presidential elections will be held 6 months after parliamentary elections.

In Moscow, armed men from the Officers Union, a conservative military group, attempt to break into the headquarters of the Commonwealth of Independent States; a police officer and a bystander are killed.

Sept. 26—The rump parliament, with about 600 delegates meeting in a parliament building whose main electricity and water supplies have been cut off by municipal authorities, has voted to hold joint presidential and parliamentary elections by March.

Sept. 28—The Interior Ministry cordons off the parliament building and stations hundreds of troops around it, telling the approximately 230 delegates and several hundred staffers remaining inside and 600 volunteer parliamentary guards that they have 24 hours to surrender an estimated 600 to 800 weapons.

Sept. 30—The 2 sides in the standoff agree to talks mediated by Patriarch Aleksy II, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, to begin tomorrow at the St. Danilov Monastery in Moscow.

## SOMALIA

(See also *Intl, UN*)

Sept. 5—In Mogadishu, the capital, 7 UN troops from Nigeria are killed and 9 other peacekeepers injured by a mob of Somalis.

Sept. 9—UN troops clearing a roadblock in Mogadishu are ambushed by about 100 Somali militia members; in an ensuing 3-hour-long gun battle, as many as 100 Somalis are killed and 1 Pakistani UN soldier dies.

Sept. 16—Two Italian peacekeepers are fatally shot while jogging in the capital, bringing the death toll for peacekeepers in Somalia to 50. A mortar attack on a UN compound in

Mogadishu kills 1 Somali and wounds 17 other Somalis and 11 peacekeepers and UN employees.

Sept. 25—Near the airport in Mogadishu, Somali grenade fire downs a UN helicopter; 3 US soldiers are killed.

## SOUTH AFRICA

Sept. 8—Black gunmen kill at least 21 blacks and wound 25 in 2 separate incidents near Johannesburg.

Sept. 23—After a 4-day debate, parliament approves a plan agreed to by negotiators at talks on South Africa's political future after apartheid that creates a predominantly black transition council that will oversee President F. W. de Klerk's government until the country's 1st universal elections are held next April; the Inkatha Freedom party and the white separatist Conservative party, which are boycotting the talks, did not agree to the plan. The council and 7 sub-councils will oversee the budget, the armed forces and the police, the civil service, and radio and television broadcasting, among other matters, and have the authority to veto all government actions that could affect the atmosphere for the elections.

Sept. 24—at the UN, ANC President Nelson Mandela calls for the lifting of all remaining economic sanctions against South Africa.

## SRI LANKA

Sept. 29—More than 100 civilians and soldiers are reported killed in an offensive that began yesterday aimed at land connecting the mainland with the Jaffna Peninsula, a stronghold of Tamil insurgents; about 9,000 government troops are participating.

## TURKEY

Sept. 3—The semiofficial Anatolia news agency reports the government today moved more soldiers to the border with Armenia, demanding Armenia "immediately and unconditionally" withdraw from occupied regions of Azerbaijan.

Sept. 12—In Diyarbakir, in the southeast, a government official announces that members of the Kurdish Workers party (PKK) rebel group kidnapped 6 Bangladeshis and 2 Iranians from a bus at Buglan Pass yesterday.

Sept. 27—Government officials in Diyarbakir announce 28 PKK rebels were killed in 2 days of fighting with army forces in the southeast; 3 soldiers and 1 police officer were also killed in the clashes.

## UKRAINE

(See also *Russia*)

Sept. 9—Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma resigns, saying economic reform cannot take place in the country without political reform.

Sept. 21—Two weeks after they were submitted, parliament votes overwhelmingly to accept the resignations of Kuchma and his cabinet.

## UNITED STATES (US)

(See also *Intl, Middle East Peace Conference; China; Russia*)

Sept. 20—in New York, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announces the US will pledge \$250 million to aid in the implementation of the recent peace accords between Israel and the PLO.

Sept. 23—A Cuban air force pilot defects to the US Naval Base in Guantánamo, Cuba; 6 days ago, a captain in the Cuban air force landed in Key West, Florida and asked for asylum.



